A possession suit requires no declaration where title is admitted and no cloud exists.

The appellants, representing the plaintiff’s estate, sought possession of a dwelling house identified as Door No. 8/5, relying on a sale deed, Ex.B6. The first respondent claimed rights under an unregistered sale agreement, Ex.A18, and disputed the property’s identification.

The trial court dismissed the possession suit while decreeing the respondent’s separate suit for specific performance. On appeal, the decree for specific performance was set aside and that suit dismissed; those appellate decisions were not challenged further. The dismissal of the possession suit was affirmed, leading to this second appeal.

The High Court considered the sale deed, agreement and Advocate Commissioner’s report and plan, Exs.C1 and C2, which identified Door Nos. 4, 5 and 6 as separate, adjoining houses.

1. Whether the courts below erred in finding that the property’s identity differed because of the door-number discrepancy, despite the property descriptions and boundaries in the documents and Commissioner’s report and plan

2. Whether the courts below erred in dismissing the possession suit for want of a declaration of title, where the appellant’s title deed was not challenged

Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court may interfere where a substantial question of law arises, including where material evidence has been ignored or findings are perverse.

The Court relied on the principle, citing Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRs, 2008 (4) SCC 594, that a declaration of title is necessary where the defendant’s denial or challenge creates a cloud on the plaintiff’s title; absent such a cloud, possession may be sought without declaratory relief.

It also applied the principle that clear documentary evidence should be assessed together and not displaced by minor inconsistencies in oral testimony.

Ex.B6 described Door Nos. 4 and 5, whereas Ex.A18 concerned Door No. 6. The Commissioner’s report and plan corroborated that these were separate adjoining houses and identified Door No. 5 as the suit property.

The lower courts’ failure to consider those materials together resulted in a perverse assessment of the property’s identity.

Since Ex.B6 was not challenged and the respondent’s specific-performance claim under Ex.A18 had been dismissed with that dismissal attaining finality, the Court found no subsisting cloud on the appellants’ title to Door No. 5; accordingly, a separate declaration was unnecessary.

It partly decreed the suit for possession and costs, but denied damages because no issue had been framed on that relief and the evidence did not establish actual loss.

Costs were awarded to the appellants throughout.