A possible trial-court view and unreliable dying declarations preclude reversal of acquittal.

The appellant-informant alleged that on 21 April 2012, his sister-in-law, Manju Gupta, poured kerosene on her husband Mahesh Gupta and set him on fire inside their room.

The appellant and his parents claimed to have broken open the room, extinguished the fire, and taken Mahesh first to District Hospital, Azamgarh and thereafter to a private hospital in Varanasi.

Mahesh allegedly regained consciousness on 24 April 2012 and disclosed that his wife had set him ablaze; the FIR was lodged on 28 April 2012 under Section 326 IPC.

Two alleged dying declarations were recorded on 29 April 2012—one by the Investigating Officer and another by the Additional City Magistrate.

Mahesh died on 7 June 2012 from septicemic shock resulting from infection caused by the burn injuries, whereafter Section 304 IPC was added.

The prosecution examined eleven witnesses, including the alleged eyewitnesses, medical witnesses, Investigating Officer, and the Magistrate who recorded the second dying declaration.

The Sessions Court acquitted Manju Gupta of the charges under Sections 326 and 304 IPC by judgment dated 26 May 2026.

The informant thereafter filed the present appeal against acquittal under Section 413 BNSS.

Whether the depositions of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, who claimed to have witnessed the immediate aftermath of the occurrence, were reliable and sufficient to support the prosecution case?

Whether the accused could be convicted on the basis of the two alleged dying declarations, Exhibits Ka-6 and Ka-15, read with the other evidence on record?

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse or otherwise warranted interference in an appeal against acquittal?

The Court considered the offences under Sections 326 and 304 IPC and the evidentiary rule governing dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

A dying declaration is admissible even if the declarant was not under an imminent expectation of death at the time of making it, but admissibility is distinct from credibility; conviction can rest on a dying declaration only when it is voluntary, truthful, consistent, and inspires confidence.

The Court relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, 2007 (4) SCC 415, and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 561, for the principle that an accused acquitted by the trial court enjoys a strengthened or double presumption of innocence, and that interference is justified only where the prosecution’s guilt-based view is the sole possible view or the acquittal is perverse.

It also relied on Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 10 SCC 636, and Jayamma v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 6 SCC 213, holding that an appellate court should not substitute its own plausible view for a possible view taken by the trial court.

The Court further applied the credibility factors identified in Irfan alias Naka v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1060, including whether the declaration was recorded at the earliest opportunity, was free from tutoring or prompting, was consistent with other evidence, and was medically and procedurally reliable.

The Court found material inconsistencies in the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 concerning who accompanied Mahesh to the hospitals, whether PW-3 went to Varanasi, the presence of PW-1 at the scene, and the manner in which the door and fire were dealt with.

Although the witnesses claimed that the door had been forcibly opened and that bedding and other articles had burned, the Investigating Officer recovered no burnt articles, found no evidence of forced opening, kerosene, soot, or burning at the scene.

The Court also regarded the unexplained absence of evidence concerning the parties’ four-year-old daughter as a significant circumstance.

The alleged oral disclosure by the deceased that his wife had deliberately torched him was inconsistent with both written dying declarations, in which he stated only that he suspected his wife and expressly said that he did not know how the fire had started.

The declarations were not recorded at the earliest opportunity, were made after the deceased had remained in the company of interested relatives, and contained inconsistencies regarding the presence of the accused, the arrival of family members, and the place where the fire was extinguished.

The Court further noted the absence of a satisfactory fitness certification by the treating doctor, the deceased’s respiratory support, procedural deficiencies in the custody and dispatch of Exhibit Ka-15, and the doubtful thumb impression and recording circumstances of Exhibit Ka-6.

These circumstances made the dying declarations admissible but unreliable.

Since the trial court’s view was a possible and reasoned view based on the evidence, it was neither perverse nor legally erroneous.

The trial court’s acquittal was found to be supported by sound reasoning and not perverse; the Court therefore declined to interfere under the appellate jurisdiction governing appeals against acquittal.

The criminal appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the acquittal of Manju Gupta under Sections 326 and 304 IPC was affirmed.