A post-trial amendment introducing a possession claim is barred absent proof of due diligence.

The revisionist-plaintiff instituted Original Suit No. 35 of 2016 seeking a decree of permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with his alleged possession of the suit property.

An ex parte interim injunction was granted on 8 March 2016. The plaintiff alleged that, despite service of the order, the defendant broke the gate lock and interfered with possession on 10 March 2016.

On 21 September 2022, the trial court directed both parties to maintain status quo.

After the matter was fixed for the plaintiff’s evidence, the plaintiff filed amendment application no. 347C2 on 20 September 2025, seeking, among other reliefs, mandatory injunction and damages. That application was rejected on 10 November 2025, and the order was not challenged.

Thereafter, on 13 January 2026, the plaintiff filed a second amendment application, paper no. 375A, seeking to plead dispossession and to add an alternative relief for recovery of possession, along with consequential amendments to valuation and court fee.

The trial court rejected the application on 13 March 2026, principally on the ground that it was barred by the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and that the plaintiff had not shown due diligence. The plaintiff challenged that order under Section 115 CPC.

1. Whether the plaintiff’s second application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, filed after framing of issues and submission of evidence affidavit, was maintainable in the absence of a showing of due diligence under the proviso to that Rule?

2. Whether the proposed amendment seeking an alternative relief of possession, based on the plaintiff’s alleged dispossession known since 2016, could be permitted after an earlier similar amendment application had been rejected and had attained finality?

3. Whether the trial court’s rejection of the amendment application disclosed any jurisdictional error, illegality, or material irregularity warranting interference under Section 115 CPC?

The court applied Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, under which amendments necessary for determining the real controversy may ordinarily be allowed, but, after commencement of trial, an amendment is permissible only where the applicant establishes that, despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised earlier.

Relying on Rajkumar Gurawara (dead) through LRs v. S.K. Sarwagi & Co. Pvt. Ltd., (2008) 14 SCC 364, the court held that pre-trial amendments are considered liberally, whereas post-commencement amendments must satisfy the proviso’s due-diligence requirement.

Following M. Revanna v. Anjanamma, (2019) 4 SCC 332, as reiterated in Basavaraj v. Indira, (2024) 3 SCC 705, the court held that an amendment may be refused if it introduces a fundamentally different or inconsistent case, and that the burden lies on the applicant to establish due diligence; amendment is not a matter of right.

The court also held that the subsequent application on substantially similar grounds was barred by the principle of res judicata, which applies at different stages of the same proceedings.

In exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, the High Court cannot reappreciate facts or substitute its view for that of the subordinate court unless the order suffers from jurisdictional error, illegality, or material irregularity.

The court found that the plaintiff had known since 2016 that his possession was disputed and that the defendant allegedly occupied the property.

The issues had been framed in 2021, and the plaintiff had filed his evidence affidavit before seeking the second amendment; therefore, the trial had commenced for purposes of the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.

The plaintiff failed to explain why the proposed plea of dispossession and alternative relief of possession could not have been raised earlier despite due diligence.

The failure was particularly significant because the plaintiff had already filed an earlier amendment application in 2025, containing detailed facts and seeking reliefs arising from the same developments, which had been rejected and left unchallenged.

The second application sought substantially similar amendments and could not circumvent the finality of the earlier order.

The trial court had consequently applied the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC correctly, and its decision disclosed no jurisdictional defect warranting revision.

Finding no material irregularity or illegality in the trial court’s order dated 13 March 2026, the Court dismissed the civil revision under Section 115 CPC.

Any pending miscellaneous applications were directed to stand closed.