A postal receipt proving dispatch alone does not establish due service of summons.

The respondent instituted a suit for recovery of damages of ₹80 lakhs against the appellants in relation to the demolition of an alleged unauthorised occupation/obstruction at Tulsi Bagh, Srinagar.

The suit was decreed ex parte on 18.12.2012, with ₹20 lakhs awarded as compensation along with 6% annual interest.

The appellants asserted that they had not been served with summons and first learned of the suit and decree on 25.04.2013 upon receiving summons in execution proceedings.

They obtained certified copies on 07.05.2013 and filed an application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree on 09.05.2013, accompanied by an application seeking condonation of 110 days’ delay.

The trial Court dismissed the condonation application, relying principally on postal receipts showing that registered summons had been dispatched in 2013.

Whether postal receipts evidencing dispatch of registered summons, without proof of actual delivery or a finding regarding proper addressing and dispatch to the correct address, were sufficient to establish due service upon the appellants.

Whether the appellants had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the 110-day delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte judgment and decree.

Whether the public-interest dimension of the dispute warranted allowing the appellants an opportunity to contest the matter on merits.

The Court applied Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, under which proper addressing, prepayment and dispatch of a document by registered or speed post may raise a rebuttable presumption of service.

However, a postal receipt ordinarily proves dispatch or posting, not actual delivery; the Court must first record satisfaction that the summons was properly addressed and sent to the correct address.

Proof of delivery may be corroborated by postal tracking records, a signed acknowledgment card, or postal endorsements such as “refused,” “house locked,” or “addressee not found.”

The Court also applied the principle that procedural delay may be condoned where sufficient cause is shown and where refusal would defeat a fair adjudication, particularly when public interest is involved.

The High Court found that the trial Court dismissed the condonation application solely because postal receipts were on record, without determining whether the summons had been properly addressed, dispatched to the appellants’ correct addresses, or actually delivered.

The appellants’ witnesses had consistently stated that the department had not received summons and became aware of the proceedings only through the execution notice.

Since the statutory presumption of service could not be mechanically drawn from proof of posting alone, the trial Court had failed to properly assess the appellants’ explanation for the delay.

Further, the dispute involved an allegation of encroachment upon State land; therefore, the High Court considered it appropriate, in the public interest, to provide the appellants an opportunity to contest the claim on merits rather than allow the matter to remain determined ex parte.

The order dated 19.08.2024 dismissing the application for condonation of delay was set aside, and the 110-day delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte proceedings was condoned.

The trial Court was directed to decide the appellants’ application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree after providing both parties a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

The High Court did not finally adjudicate the validity of the ex parte decree on merits.