A preliminary enquiry and confession cannot substitute a regular disciplinary proceeding before imposing dismissal.

The appellant, a Head Assistant in the IFU, SWM-I, Branch VIII of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (“KMC”), was alleged to have misappropriated municipal funds by preparing and passing supplementary bills in favour of unauthorised persons.

A preliminary fact-finding Enquiry Committee was constituted on 19 May 2015. Before and during the Committee proceedings, the appellant submitted a written declaration on non-judicial stamp paper accepting responsibility for generating and passing false bills involving ₹11,84,008 and stated that he had deposited part of the amount. He subsequently deposited ₹3 lakh and sought time to pay the balance.

On the Committee’s recommendation, the disciplinary authority dismissed him from service on 10 June 2015, treating his admission as sufficient proof of misconduct.

The appellate authority dismissed his statutory appeal on 24 July 2018.

His writ petition challenging the dismissal was rejected by the learned Single Judge on 22 July 2022 on the ground that, in view of his confession and repayment, a regular disciplinary proceeding was unnecessary.

The appellant preferred the present appeal, contending that the KMC had failed to issue a charge-sheet and conduct the disciplinary proceeding prescribed by its Service Regulations and departmental circulars.

Whether the KMC could impose the major penalty of dismissal solely on the basis of an admission made during a preliminary fact-finding enquiry, without issuing a charge-sheet and conducting a regular disciplinary proceeding.

Whether the Enquiry Committee was competent to recommend the appellant’s dismissal, and whether the KMC was required to consult or refer the matter to its Vigilance Authority under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Powers and Functions of the Vigilance Authority) Rules, 1994.

Whether confirmation of the dismissal by the appellate authority cured the alleged procedural illegality committed by the disciplinary authority.

The Court applied Regulation 50 of the KMC Service Regulations, which requires framing and supply of charges and an opportunity to explain the alleged misconduct before imposition of punishment, except in specified cases such as conviction on a criminal charge.

It relied on Commissioner’s Circular No. 6 of 1979–80, which characterises a preliminary enquiry as a non-punitive, fact-finding exercise intended only to determine whether a prima facie case exists; material from that enquiry may be relied upon in a regular proceeding only after disclosure to the employee, and a formal enquiry may be dispensed with only where the employee expressly and in writing admits the charges after service of the charge-sheet.

The Court also considered the 1994 Vigilance Rules, under which cases involving misappropriation of Corporation money, breach of trust, forgery, financial impropriety and related misconduct were within the Vigilance Authority’s functions and schedule.

The principles in Jagdish Prasad Saxena v. State of Madhya Bharat, Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat, Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh and Union of India v. R. Reddappa establish that a preliminary enquiry cannot substitute a regular disciplinary enquiry; an employee must receive a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and challenge the evidence; prescribed procedures must be followed; and an illegal disciplinary order does not become lawful merely because it is affirmed in appeal.

The Court distinguished the preliminary enquiry from a regular disciplinary proceeding. The Committee’s proceedings were designed only to collect facts and form a prima facie opinion, not to adjudicate guilt or impose punishment.

Although the appellant’s written confession could constitute relevant evidence, it was obtained before the formal disciplinary process and was not an express admission of charges made in response to a charge-sheet under the KMC procedure.

The appellant was not supplied with a formal statement of charges, the documents relied upon, or a list of witnesses, nor was he given an opportunity to explain the circumstances of the confession, challenge the evidence, or establish his defence.

The Court held that the possibility that the appellant might ultimately be found guilty did not justify treating the prescribed disciplinary proceeding as an empty formality.

Since the dismissal was imposed solely on the preliminary Committee’s recommendation and admission, it violated Regulation 50, the departmental circular, and natural justice.

The appellate confirmation did not cure the original illegality because an unlawful order does not acquire legality merely through repetition or affirmance in appeal.

The order of the learned Single Judge, the disciplinary authority’s dismissal order, and the appellate authority’s order confirming the dismissal were set aside.

The KMC was directed to reinstate the appellant within one week in the post held by him before dismissal and treat him as a regular employee.

The Corporation was given liberty to suspend him after reinstatement in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings, subject to the applicable service rules and payment of subsistence allowance.

The disciplinary authority was permitted to issue a charge-sheet within two weeks; the appellant was to submit his written defence within fifteen days of receiving it, and the disciplinary proceeding was to be concluded expeditiously.

No final direction was issued regarding back wages; that question was left subject to the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding.

The appeal and connected application were accordingly disposed of, and the request for stay of the judgment was refused.