A private bribe conduit may face conspiracy prosecution despite not making the gratification demand.

The petitioner, Sunita, operated a tea stall outside Police Station Govind Puri. The complainant alleged that co-accused ASI Sushil Sharma demanded ₹50,000, later reduced to ₹10,000, for removing the names of the complainant’s minor daughters from a criminal case.

On the ASI’s instructions, the complainant initially paid ₹5,000 to Sunita, who counted the money, observed that it was only ₹5,000 against the demanded ₹10,000, and informed the ASI by telephone.

During a trap on 10 June 2025, Sunita received the tainted currency from the complainant, entered the police station, and handed it over to the ASI, from whose possession the money was recovered.

The FIR was registered under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Sunita sought quashing of the FIR and consequential proceedings under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

1. Whether the FIR and consequential proceedings against the petitioner were liable to be quashed under Section 528 of the BNSS on the ground that she was not a public servant and had neither demanded nor accepted illegal gratification in her own capacity.

2. Whether the allegations and investigation material disclosed a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy under Section 61(2) of the BNS between the petitioner and the co-accused ASI.

3. Whether the absence of direct evidence of a prior agreement or meeting of minds justified quashing the FIR at the investigative stage.

The Court applied Section 528 of the BNSS, corresponding to the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which an FIR may be quashed sparingly where, even accepting the allegations at face value, no cognizable offence is disclosed.

It relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, particularly the principle that proceedings may be quashed where the allegations do not prima facie constitute an offence, but that the High Court must not conduct a mini-trial or assess the credibility and probative value of evidence at that stage.

Section 7 of the PC Act concerns bribery-related conduct by a public servant, while Section 61(2) of the BNS criminalises criminal conspiracy; allegations of conspiracy must be considered cumulatively with the underlying criminal conduct.

A criminal conspiracy is ordinarily hatched in secrecy and may be inferred from surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused; direct evidence of the precise agreement or meeting of minds is not indispensable at the stage of considering quashing.

The Court distinguished Mr. Murali Krishna R. v. State of Karnataka because that case involved only Section 7(a) of the PC Act and not an allegation of criminal conspiracy.

Although the petitioner contended that she was not a public servant, had not made any demand, and had merely performed a passive physical act without mens rea, the Court held that the allegations had to be examined in their entirety because the FIR also invoked Section 61(2) of the BNS.

The petitioner’s conduct was not limited to mechanically receiving money: she accepted the initial ₹5,000, recognised that the amount was less than the demanded sum, contacted the ASI, and informed him of the payment.

On the trap date, she again contacted the ASI when the complainant arrived, received the tainted money after the ASI instructed the complainant to pay her, and delivered it to the ASI inside the police station, following which it was recovered from him.

These circumstances prima facie indicated that she acted as the ASI’s intermediary or conduit and was aware of the arrangement.

The CDR material showing repeated contact between the petitioner and the ASI, together with the CCTV footage, audio recording, and the complainant’s statement under Section 183 of the BNSS, further supported the prosecution case, though their evidentiary weight remained matters for trial.

Since conspiracy could be inferred from circumstances and did not require proof at this stage of the precise prior agreement, the case did not fall within the Bhajan Lal categories warranting quashing.

The allegations, taken cumulatively, prima facie disclosed her involvement as an intermediary in the alleged bribery conspiracy under Section 61(2) of the BNS, and the absence of direct evidence of a prior agreement was a matter for trial.

The petition under Section 528 of the BNSS was accordingly dismissed, and the FIR No. 08/2025 dated 10 June 2025 and consequential proceedings against the petitioner were permitted to continue.