A purely accidental fatal injury during a scuffle attracts no criminal liability under Section 80 IPC.

On 16 May 2003, Sandeep sustained a fatal penetrating chest injury from a pair of scissors during a scuffle with the appellant, Narender, at a wrestling akhara over the cutting of hair.

Sandeep was taken first to Malik Nursing Home and thereafter to ESI Hospital, where he was declared dead.

The FIR was initially registered under Section 304 IPC and was subsequently altered to Section 302 IPC after the post-mortem doctor opined that the eighth injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and could have been caused by the recovered scissors.

The Trial Court convicted Narender under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.

In appeal, the prosecution principally relied on PW-3 Neeraj and PW-8 Naveen; however, both witnesses turned hostile and neither testified that they had seen Narender inflict the fatal injury.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had inflicted the fatal scissor injury upon Sandeep

Whether the appellant possessed the intention or knowledge necessary to constitute culpable homicide or murder under Sections 299 and 302 IPC

Whether the appellant’s failure to explain the precise manner in which Sandeep sustained the injury could, by itself, complete the prosecution case under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872

Whether the incident constituted a purely accidental occurrence protected by Section 80 IPC

The Court applied Section 302 IPC, which requires proof of murder, and Section 299 IPC, which requires proof of the requisite intention or knowledge for culpable homicide.

Medical evidence may establish the nature, cause and sufficiency of the injury but cannot, by itself, establish the accused’s authorship of the injury or the requisite criminal intent.

The testimony of a hostile witness is not wholly effaced; the Court may rely on the portion that is credible, while separating reliable evidence from unreliable evidence.

Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden of proving the foundational facts of the offence.

Section 80 IPC protects an act resulting in harm where the act was accidental and was done without criminal knowledge or intention.

The post-mortem and medical opinion proved that Sandeep died from a deep scissor injury and that the injury was neither self-inflicted nor accidental in the medical sense.

Nevertheless, the prosecution failed to prove that Narender had possession of the scissors or that he intentionally used them to stab Sandeep.

PW-3 and PW-8 established, at most, the presence of the appellant and deceased, the hair-cutting dispute, the ensuing scuffle and the resultant injury; neither witness saw Narender deliver the fatal blow.

Their evidence also indicated that Sandeep had first attempted to cut Narender’s hair and that Narender was resisting, making the appellant not the aggressor.

The recovery of the scissors from the scene, rather than from the appellant, did not connect him conclusively with the fatal injury.

Narender’s conduct in taking Sandeep to the hospital, the absence of prior enmity, and Sandeep’s statement to the doctor that he had been injured by scissors during a scuffle further weakened the prosecution’s case on intention and authorship.

The Court held that the prosecution could not use Section 106 of the Evidence Act to fill these evidentiary gaps.

On the proved circumstances, the injury was treated as accidental and unaccompanied by the criminal intention or knowledge necessary under Sections 299 and 302 IPC.

The occurrence was found to be an accidental injury sustained during a scuffle, attracting Section 80 IPC.

The appeal was allowed; the judgment of conviction dated 18 December 2004 and order on sentence dated 21 December 2004 were set aside, and Narender was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC.

His bail bond was directed to remain valid for three months.