A reasonably possible acquittal cannot be reversed absent perversity or material misappreciation of evidence.

The prosecution alleged that on 24 August 2013, Raja drove a tipper truck rashly and negligently near Lighthouse Hill junction, striking two people, both of whom later died.

He was charged under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code.

The JMFC acquitted him on 19 March 2016. The State appealed against the acquittal under Section 378 CrPC.

At trial, seven witnesses were examined.

The alleged eyewitnesses and mahazar witnesses did not support the prosecution, and the accused denied the allegations in his Section 313 CrPC statement.

1. Whether the trial court’s acquittal of the accused for offences under Sections 279 and 304A IPC was liable to be set aside on the evidence on record

2. Whether the trial court’s assessment of the evidence disclosed a basis for appellate interference with the acquittal

The appeal arose under Section 378 CrPC, which permits an appeal against acquittal.

Relying on *Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand*, (2025) 5 SCC 433; *Babu Sahebgouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka*, (2024) 8 SCC 149; *Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka*, (2007) 4 SCC 415; and *H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka*, (2023) 9 SCC 581, the Court stated that an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence and that, although an appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, it must not overturn an acquittal if the trial court’s view is a possible one.

Interference is warranted where the acquittal is patently perverse, rests on a misreading or omission of material evidence, or where the evidence permits no reasonable conclusion other than guilt.

The Court found that PW2, described as an eyewitness, did not support the prosecution, as did other witnesses to the incident or mahazar.

PW1’s evidence was not substantiated by PW2; PW1 also admitted that he was not the scribe of the complaint, and the scribe was not examined.

The Court considered the trial court’s treatment of this evidence a proper assessment and concluded that the State had not shown perversity or another ground warranting interference under the applicable acquittal-appeal standard.

The criminal appeal was dismissed, leaving the acquittal of Raja for the alleged offences under Sections 279 and 304A IPC undisturbed.