A reliable prosecutrix’s testimony alone can sustain a rape conviction.

The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 376 IPC and sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment, with a fine of ₹5,000, imposed by the Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, in Sessions Trial No. 3 of 2005.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant repeatedly raped Victim No. 1 after bringing her to Ranchi on the false promise of employment.

Victim No. 1 and Victim No. 2 testified at trial; the medical evidence recorded no evidence of sexual intercourse at the time of examination and estimated their ages at 16–17 and 15–16 years, respectively.

The FIR was registered on 19 February 2004, and the trial court convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the reliability of the prosecution case, citing delay, inconsistencies, lack of corroboration, and the victims’ continued association with him; alternatively, he sought reduction of sentence to the period already undergone.

Whether the conviction under Section 376 IPC suffered from an error warranting appellate interference.

Whether the appellant’s sentence should be reduced to the period already undergone, given the time elapsed since the offence and his custody served.

The court applied Section 376 IPC.

It stated that a prosecutrix’s testimony, if found reliable and trustworthy, can by itself sustain a conviction in a rape case.

The appellant relied on Manak Chand @ Mani v. State of Haryana, (2024) 20 SCC 561, but the court held that decision did not assist him.

The judgment did not identify a separate statutory provision or doctrinal test governing reduction of sentence; it considered the elapsed time and custody already served in determining whether further imprisonment was required.

The court accepted the victims’ testimony as categorical evidence that the appellant sexually exploited them on the pretext of providing employment.

It concluded that this evidence supported the conviction and found no reason to depart from the trial court’s finding, notwithstanding the defence challenges to delay, consistency, and corroboration.

On sentence, the court noted that the offence dated from 2003, more than two decades had passed, and the appellant had served approximately one year and four months in custody; it considered further imprisonment unnecessary.

The appeal was dismissed on the merits with that modification.

As the appellant was on bail, he was discharged from his bail bond, and the sureties were also discharged.