A rent revision becomes infructuous once lawful execution of eviction order delivers possession to the landlord.

The Petitioners-tenant challenged, under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”), the Additional Rent Controller’s order dated 22 March 2022 dismissing their applications for leave to defend and directing eviction from Shop No. 4932/7, Fataknamak, Hauz Quazi, Delhi.

The Respondent-landlord claimed ownership through a registered Will and sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the DRC Act on the ground that the premises were bona fide required to settle her son, Pawan Kumar Bhutani, in business.

The Petitioners contended, inter alia, that Pawan Kumar was already carrying on business under the name “Jai Durga Enterprises” from the first floor of the same property and that the alleged requirement was neither bona fide nor genuine.

During the revision, the Respondent died, and the Court imposed user and occupation charges as a condition for continuation of interim protection.

Owing to non-payment of the stipulated charges, the interim protection ceased to operate; warrants of possession were issued and executed on 13 October 2025, resulting in delivery of vacant and peaceful possession to the Respondent’s legal heir. The execution proceedings were recorded as satisfied on 7 November 2025.

The Court applied Sections 14(1)(e) and 25-B of the DRC Act, governing eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement and the summary procedure for such claims, and the proviso to Section 25-B(8), which confers limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction on the High Court.

Under N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana, 2003 (1) SCC 453, and Vinod Kumar Verma v. Manmohan Verma, Civil Appeal Nos. 5220–5221/2008, once possession has been obtained through execution of the eviction order, further adjudication may be purely academic and the proceedings may be treated as infructuous.

The same principle was followed in Neelam Sharma v. Ekant Rekhan, RC.REV. 398/2018, affirmed by the Supreme Court, and in subsequent decisions including Gulzar Singh v. Raj Rani, Noor Ahmad v. Mohd. Sadiq, and Nathi Lal Chaurasia v. Sushila Devi Jain.

On merits, Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, establishes that the landlord is ordinarily the best judge of the suitability and convenience of premises and that the tenant cannot dictate how the landlord should arrange or conduct the business.

The revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) is restricted to examining jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record; it is not appellate jurisdiction permitting reappreciation of evidence.

The Court held that the eviction order had not merely become executable but had been fully implemented through warrants of possession, followed by delivery of vacant and peaceful possession and recording of satisfaction of the execution proceedings.

Consequently, no effective or executable relief remained available to the Petitioners, and adjudication of the revision would be academic.

In any event, on the limited merits urged, the Additional Rent Controller had expressly considered the fact that Pawan Kumar was conducting business from the first floor, but reasonably distinguished that existing accommodation from the asserted need for the more convenient and commercially suitable ground-floor shop.

The Respondent’s clarification in her reply to the leave-to-defend application did not amount to abandonment or substitution of the original plea; it elaborated upon why the ground-floor premises were required for the existing business.

Reappreciating whether the first floor was sufficiently suitable would exceed the restricted scope of revision under Section 25-B(8), particularly in the absence of perversity, illegality, or material irregularity.

The Court also found no revisional error in the Additional Rent Controller’s conclusion that the requirement for the ground-floor premises was bona fide.

The revision petition and all pending applications were accordingly dismissed as infructuous, without costs; the observations on merits were expressly stated not to constitute the basis of disposal.