A restitution decree alone does not disqualify a wife from maintenance under Section 125(4).

The petitioner-wife sought maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C., alleging dowry-related cruelty and that she had been compelled to leave the matrimonial home.

The respondent-husband denied the allegations, asserting that she lived separately without sufficient reason and that he was willing to keep her with him.

The Family Court found that the wife could not maintain herself and that the husband had sufficient means, but dismissed her application because she had not complied with an ex parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights.

The wife challenged that order in revision.

The record showed that she complained to the police on 2 October 2010, the husband sought restitution of conjugal rights on 4 October 2010, and an ex parte decree was passed on 29 March 2011; the husband later filed for divorce.

The husband also relied on the subsequent acquittal in the criminal case.

1. Whether the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, and the wife’s non-compliance with it, was by itself sufficient to disentitle her to maintenance under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.

2. Whether the wife had sufficient reason to live separately, notwithstanding the acquittal in the criminal case arising from her allegations of cruelty.

Section 125 Cr.P.C. provides a summary remedy to prevent destitution and vagrancy; a wife seeking maintenance must establish that she is unable to maintain herself, that her husband has sufficient means and neglects or refuses to maintain her, and that she has sufficient reason to live separately.

Under Section 125(4), a decree for restitution of conjugal rights obtained by the husband, coupled with the wife’s non-compliance, does not automatically disentitle her to maintenance; the question depends on the facts and evidence of the case (Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 4 SCC 479; Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato, 2025 (3) SCC 33).

An acquittal in a prosecution under Section 498-A IPC does not, by itself, negate the wife’s sworn account of cruelty or remove her reasonable ground to live separately.

Maintenance is a measure of social justice intended to prevent destitution (Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, (2008) 2 SCC 316; Bhuwan Mohan v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353; Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324).

The Family Court treated non-compliance with the restitution decree as determinative and, on that basis, rejected the wife’s account of why she lived separately.

The High Court held that this approach was legally unsustainable: the decree was passed ex parte after the wife’s police complaint, and the husband made no recorded attempt to enforce it before filing for divorce.

The wife’s prosecution of the husband under Section 498-A IPC, together with her testimony of cruelty, provided a reasonable basis for separate residence; the later acquittal did not, by itself, erase that evidence.

Since the Family Court had already found that the wife could not maintain herself and that the husband had sufficient means, it erred in denying maintenance solely on the restitution decree and its non-compliance.

It allowed the revision, set aside the Family Court’s order, and remanded the matter for determination of the quantum of maintenance in accordance with law and the guidelines in Rajnesh v. Neha.