A Scrutinizer’s statutory election functions do not extend to adjudicating or settling the membership register.

The appellants, claiming to be members of the respondent no. 14 Club, instituted a suit alleging irregularities in the Club’s Register of Members and electoral roll, including improper admissions, inclusion of ineligible or defaulting members, and non-compliance with the Club’s Articles of Association.

Appellant no. 2 was also a candidate in the Club elections scheduled for 27 September 2026.

The appellants sought ad interim directions for independent supervision of the nomination process, scrutiny and settlement of the electoral roll, and electronic and physical voting, either through a Special Officer or by enlarging the role of the appointed Scrutinizer.

The Trial Court refused the ex parte ad interim injunction by Order No. 2 dated 9 September 2026.

During the appeal, the respondents stated that reciprocal members, probationary members and sports members were ineligible to vote, and disputed the appellants’ interpretation of the voters’ list, including the designation “inactive”.

The appellants also sought to rely on the Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014, particularly Rule 21, to enlarge the Scrutinizer’s functions.

Whether the appellants were entitled to ad interim injunctive relief directing independent supervision or reopening of the Club’s electoral roll and election process on the basis of the pleaded irregularities in the Register of Members.

Whether the Scrutinizer appointed for the election could be directed to investigate the validity and maintenance of the Register of Members and perform functions analogous to those of a Special Officer or Receiver.

Whether the appellants could raise, at the appellate stage, new objections concerning “inactive” members and other alleged defects in the voters’ list which were not specifically pleaded before the Trial Court.

Whether the proposed intervenors should be permitted to intervene in the appeal at the stage of final hearing.

The Court applied the Club’s Articles of Association, particularly Article 20(vi), requiring maintenance of a Register of Members open to inspection by members on requisition, and Article 20(viii), concerning inspection of the Club’s statutory books.

It held that a prayer for appointment of a Special Officer or Receiver must satisfy the legal standards governing receivership under Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and cannot be granted on vague or unparticularised allegations.

The Court further applied Rule 21 of the Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014, which defines the Scrutinizer’s functions in relation to the conduct of polling, verification of voting materials, counting of votes and submission of the election report; the Rule does not confer upon the Scrutinizer the power to adjudicate the validity or maintenance of the Register of Members before the election.

The Court also applied the procedural principle that an appellate court should not permit parties to substantially expand the scope of the appeal by introducing new factual allegations absent from the pleadings before the Trial Court.

The Court held that the appellants’ pleadings were insufficiently specific: assertions that the Register had not been “duly settled,” that disputed admissions remained reflected in it, and that persons in arrears might be entitled to vote did not identify particular members, concrete irregularities or supporting particulars.

Since the plaint itself proceeded on allegations concerning the Register, the Court inferred that the appellants must have had access to it; alternatively, the allegations would be rendered vexatious if they had no such access.

The appellants had not pleaded that their request for inspection under the Articles had been refused.

Their attempt to challenge “inactive” voters and raise other objections based on the voters’ list supplied during the appeal was therefore treated as an impermissible expansion beyond the original pleadings.

The Court also found that the respondents’ clarification—that reciprocal, probationary and sports members were not eligible to vote—substantially answered the immediate apprehension regarding those categories.

Directing the Scrutinizer to examine the validity of the Register would effectively convert him into a Special Officer or Receiver and would delegate to him an adjudicatory function belonging to the Civil Court, contrary to the limited role prescribed by Rule 21.

Reopening the electoral-roll process immediately before the scheduled election would also risk stalling the election and would be impracticable to supervise.

The Court declined to order independent supervision of the election, fresh scrutiny or settlement of the electoral roll, or enlargement of the Scrutinizer’s statutory role.

The proposed intervenors were not permitted to intervene at the appellate stage, though they were left at liberty to approach the Trial Court for impleadment in accordance with law.

The respondents were directed to file their written objection to the temporary injunction application, if not already filed, within two weeks, and the Trial Court was requested to dispose of that application expeditiously.

The observations were declared tentative and confined to the ad interim appeal, with all contentions left open before the Trial Court; there was no order as to costs.