A second anticipatory-bail petition requires a genuine, subsequent, and material change in circumstances.

The petitioner sought anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), in FIR No. 19 dated 27.03.2025, registered at Police Station Harike, District Tarn Taran, for offences under Sections 140(3), 115, 116, 191(3), 190 and 324(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, with Section 118(2) subsequently added.

The prosecution alleged that the petitioner and his family members assaulted the complainant’s son, the complainant, his wife and his brother during an occurrence arising from a dispute between the parties; the petitioner was specifically alleged to have caused kirpan injuries to the complainant’s arm and to Ranjit Kaur’s head.

The petitioner contended that the occurrence involved a version and cross-version, that he had himself suffered grievous injuries, and that the genesis and identity of the aggressor were disputed.

His earlier application for anticipatory bail had been dismissed by the High Court on merits on 27.05.2025, after the Additional Sessions Judge had rejected the prayer on 01.05.2025.

The present proceedings constituted a second petition for the same relief.

The Court applied Section 482 of the BNSS, 2023, which provides for anticipatory bail and is akin to Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

It held that a successive petition for anticipatory bail, after an earlier petition has been dismissed on merits, can be entertained only where the petitioner demonstrates a genuine, subsequent and material change in circumstances having a direct bearing on entitlement to pre-arrest protection.

The Court further applied the principles that parity is not mechanical or mathematical and must be based on parity of circumstances, not merely common affiliation or involvement in the same occurrence.

Matters already available for consideration during the earlier adjudication, or matters going to the merits of the prosecution case, cannot ordinarily be re-agitated in a successive petition absent a significant intervening circumstance.

The extraordinary and discretionary nature of anticipatory bail also requires respect for finality in judicial orders.

The Court found that the petitioner had not shown any intervening circumstance materially undermining the prosecution case or invalidating the reasons for dismissal of the earlier petition.

The grant of bail to an accused from the opposite faction in the cross-case neither erased the allegations against the petitioner nor altered the nature, gravity or evidentiary character of the accusations in the present FIR; therefore, it did not create a parity-based entitlement.

The petitioner’s reliance on the cross-version, his own injuries, the disputed genesis, the individual injuries attributed to him and the property/path dispute either had already been available during the earlier proceedings or constituted matters for trial, rather than a subsequent change warranting anticipatory bail.

Considering the allegations, the specific role attributed to the petitioner, the injuries, the pending investigation and the absence of a substantive change in circumstances, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.

Bail granted to an accused in the cross-case did not establish parity or justify reconsideration of the petitioner’s claim.

Accordingly, the petition for anticipatory bail was dismissed, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case.

All pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of as infructuous.