Disputed title and pending declaratory proceedings justify leave to defend despite an alleged co-ownership admission.

The petitioner-landlord filed a rent-control eviction petition, RC ARC No. 43/2021, against the respondent-tenant concerning premises situated at Property No. 1780, Kucha Lattoo Shah, Dariba Kalan, Chandni Chowk, Delhi.

The petitioner claimed ownership and bona fide requirement of the premises for carrying on a goldsmith business.

The respondent sought leave to defend, contending, inter alia, that the petitioner had concealed material facts regarding a pending civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction, CS DJ No. 443/2017, in which the petitioner’s asserted title, family settlement, and Will were disputed.

The Additional Rent Controller allowed the respondent’s application for leave to defend by order dated 13 November 2024, holding that the petitioner’s title and entitlement raised triable issues.

The petitioner challenged that order under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, principally arguing that the respondent had admitted him to be a co-owner and that no triable issue survived.

Whether the Additional Rent Controller erred in granting leave to defend despite the respondent’s alleged admission that the petitioner was a co-owner competent to maintain the eviction petition?

Whether the petitioner demonstrated any jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958?

Whether the pending civil proceedings and the alleged concealment or inconsistency regarding the petitioner’s title and ownership constituted triable issues requiring an opportunity to defend?

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, under which the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction over an order of the Rent Controller and does not sit as an appellate court.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that interference is warranted only for an error apparent on the face of the record, jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or failure to adjudicate a material issue; the High Court cannot substitute its view merely because another view is possible.

The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, affirming the restricted scope of revision.

Although a co-owner may ordinarily maintain an eviction petition without proving absolute or exclusive ownership, a genuine dispute concerning the petitioner’s asserted title, share, or entitlement may constitute a triable issue at the leave-to-defend stage.

The Court held that the petitioner’s reliance on the alleged admission of co-ownership involved a selective reading of the pleadings.

The petitioner had himself instituted a civil suit seeking declaration of title in respect of the property, asserting a particular chain of title, a family settlement by metes and bounds, and a Will, all of which were disputed by other parties to that suit.

The petitioner had also pleaded absolute ownership in the eviction proceedings without adequately explaining the derivation of title or disclosing the pending civil proceedings, enabling the ARC to treat the alleged concealment and inconsistencies as material.

The general rule that a co-owner can seek eviction did not conclusively resolve the specific dispute concerning the petitioner’s status, share, and entitlement.

Since these matters could affect the petitioner’s right to obtain eviction and required evidentiary adjudication, the respondent’s defence was not sham, frivolous, or irrelevant.

The ARC had considered the rival pleadings and recorded reasons for granting leave; reassessing those conclusions would amount to impermissible appellate reappreciation under Section 25-B(8).

The alleged admission of co-ownership did not conclusively establish the petitioner’s entitlement to eviction at the leave-to-defend stage.

No jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or error apparent on the face of the record was demonstrated.

Accordingly, the revision petition was dismissed, the ARC’s order granting leave to defend was upheld, and the pending applications, if any, were disposed of.

The Court clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the parties’ rival claims, which were to be adjudicated by the ARC in accordance with law.