A second FIR is impermissible when it concerns the same transaction as an earlier FIR.

The petitioner, then Headmaster of a government primary school, allegedly withdrew ₹1,87,000 allotted for construction of a kitchen shed and boundary wall but failed to complete the work.

An earlier FIR, Ahiyapur P.S. Case No. 296 of 2009, had been registered against him concerning the same alleged defalcation under Sections 409, 419 and 420 IPC.

In 2017, a further FIR—Ahiyapur P.S. Case No. 411 of 2017—was registered under Section 409 IPC on the basis of the same alleged withdrawal and non-completion of construction.

The petitioner sought to quash the later FIR and its consequential proceedings.

He also asserted that the amount had been repaid, a circumstance the Court noted but did not treat as independently determinative.

1. Whether the 2017 FIR was impermissible as a successive FIR concerning the same occurrence or transaction already covered by the 2009 FIR

2. Whether the petitioner’s repayment of the amount independently warranted quashing the later FIR

Under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court may prevent abuse of the process of court.

The governing principle on successive FIRs, as stated with reference to T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala and reiterated in Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra, is that a second FIR ordinarily cannot be registered for the same cognizable offence, occurrence, or transaction; the test is whether the FIRs relate to the same transaction.

A later FIR may be permissible for a distinct occurrence, counter-version, separate incident, or larger conspiracy.

A change in the penal sections cited does not, by itself, make the later FIR a separate occurrence.

Repayment may be relevant to whether continuation serves a useful purpose, but is not by itself determinative of the legality of a second FIR.

The Court found that both FIRs concerned the same funds, school construction work, alleged withdrawals, and failure to complete the work; the later FIR disclosed no fresh or independent occurrence and was not a counter-case.

The fact that the second FIR specifically invoked Section 409 IPC, while the first included Sections 409, 419 and 420 IPC, did not alter the underlying transaction.

The allegations were therefore pari materia, and allowing the later case to proceed would subject the petitioner to a second investigation and prosecution for the same transaction.

The Court noted the alleged repayment but resolved the application on the successive-FIR ground without deciding the competing explanations for the incomplete construction.

It quashed Ahiyapur P.S. Case No. 411 of 2017 under Section 409 IPC and all consequential proceedings against the petitioner, and allowed the application.