A selection authority may prescribe enhanced suitability thresholds before recruitment begins when governing rules are silent.

The petitioners, Civil Judges, sought inclusion in the final select list for promotion to the post of Senior Civil Judge.

The High Court initially notified 52 vacancies on 31.03.2023, reserving the right to alter the number of vacancies.

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Mehta v. High Court of Gujarat dated 17.05.2024, which suggested enhancing the minimum threshold in the suitability test and its components, the Selection Committee resolved on 24.06.2024 to raise the minimum qualifying marks from 40% to 50% in each component.

On 22.07.2024, the vacancies were increased from 52 to 124 and the eligible Civil Judges falling within the zone of consideration were notified.

The petitioners qualified in the ACR and disposal components, but were excluded from the select list dated 16.05.2025 because they failed to secure 50% in the component relating to evaluation of judgments.

Their representations seeking application of the earlier standard of 40% in each component and 50% aggregate were rejected on 30.06.2025.

After withdrawing an Article 32 petition with liberty to approach the High Court, the petitioners filed the present proceedings and sought, by amendment, quashing of the Selection Committee’s decision dated 24.06.2024 and consequential consideration of their candidature.

1. Whether the enhancement of the minimum qualifying marks from 40% to 50% in each component, after the original notification dated 31.03.2023 but before the revised notification dated 22.07.2024, amounted to an impermissible change in the “rules of the game”.

2. Whether the Selection Committee constituted by the Chief Justice had jurisdiction to devise and modify the procedure and qualifying benchmarks for assessing suitability for promotion under Rule 6 of the Gujarat State Judicial Services Rules, 2005.

3. Whether the select list was invalid because the promotion process was completed after the timeline contemplated in Malik Mazhar Sultan v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission.

4. Whether the petitioners were entitled to consideration on the basis of their aggregate marks under the earlier criterion of 40% in each component and 50% overall.

Article 234 of the Constitution requires appointments to the State Judicial Service to be made under rules framed by the Governor after consultation with the Public Service Commission and the High Court, while Article 309 authorises the framing of service rules.

Rule 6 of the Gujarat State Judicial Services Rules, 2005 provides that Senior Civil Judges are to be promoted from Civil Judges with at least five years’ service, selected by the High Court on the basis of merit-cum-seniority.

Under Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, where the rules are silent, the competent recruiting authority may devise the selection procedure and prescribe benchmarks, provided they are transparent, non-arbitrary, rationally connected to the objective, and fixed before the relevant stage of selection; a benchmark cannot be introduced after that stage has concluded.

Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Mehta explained the operation of merit-cum-seniority and suggested enhancement of the minimum threshold marks in the suitability test and its components.

Administrative instructions may supplement silent rules but cannot contradict the statutory rules or the Constitution.

The Full Court may entrust assessment of suitability to a Selection Committee and subsequently ratify or correct its recommendations.

The timelines in Malik Mazhar Sultan must be understood in the context of subsequent judicial proceedings and operative interim orders affecting the relevant promotional process.

The Court held that Rule 6 prescribed only the substantive requirement of merit-cum-seniority and minimum qualifying service; it did not prescribe the methodology or benchmark for assessing suitability. Consequently, the High Court was competent to devise an appropriate procedure.

Although the original notification was issued on 31.03.2023, the revised notification dated 22.07.2024 superseded it and increased the vacancies from 52 to 124. The Selection Committee had fixed the enhanced 50% benchmark on 24.06.2024, before the revised notification and before the relevant selection process under that notification commenced.

Therefore, the benchmark was not introduced after the candidates had undergone the relevant assessment and did not constitute a prohibited alteration of the rules after the game had been played.

The enhancement was also based on the Supreme Court’s specific suggestion in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Mehta and was rationally connected with identifying candidates possessing the requisite suitability.

The Selection Committee had been authorised by the Chief Justice pursuant to the Full Court’s resolution, and its assessment was ultimately placed before and ratified by the Full Court; it was therefore not acting as the final appointing authority or outside its jurisdiction.

The delay in finalising the process was justified because the High Court had sought modification of the Malik Mazhar Sultan timeline and was awaiting the Supreme Court’s decision in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Mehta, particularly in view of the interim order operating in the related promotional process.

Since the petitioners admittedly failed to obtain 50% in each component, they did not satisfy the applicable suitability threshold and could not claim inclusion in the select list.

It upheld the Selection Committee’s decision dated 24.06.2024 enhancing the minimum qualifying marks to 50% in each component, holding that the criterion was fixed before commencement of the relevant selection process, was within the authority delegated to the Selection Committee, and was subsequently ratified by the Full Court.

As the petitioners failed to meet the mandatory 50% threshold in each component, they were ineligible for promotion and had no enforceable right to inclusion in the select list.

The amended challenge was held unnecessary, and the writ petition was dismissed for want of merit.