A self-cheque delivered toward repayment of debt attracts the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139.

The complainant alleged that he lent the accused ₹8,00,000 in cash; after repayment of ₹5,00,000, the accused issued a self-cheque for the remaining ₹3,00,000.

The cheque was dishonoured for insufficient funds, and the complainant initiated proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).

The trial court convicted the accused and imposed a fine of ₹4,33,000, of which ₹4,30,000 was payable to the complainant; the appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

In revision, the accused challenged the concurrent findings, relying on alleged inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, an asserted prior notice, and the contention that the complainant was not a holder in due course because the cheque was a self-cheque.

Section 138 of the NI Act applies where a cheque is issued in discharge, wholly or partly, of a legally enforceable debt or liability and the statutory requirements concerning presentation, dishonour, demand notice, and non-payment are satisfied.

Sections 118 and 139 raise rebuttable presumptions concerning consideration and the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.

Under Section 9, a holder in due course includes a person who, for consideration, becomes the possessor of a cheque payable to bearer, or the payee or indorsee of a cheque payable to order, subject to the statutory conditions.

Revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. is supervisory, not a second appeal; interference with concurrent findings is warranted only in exceptional cases, including where findings are perverse, grossly erroneous, based on irrelevant or no material, or reached through arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.

The Court relied on Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, Criminal Appeal No. 3654 of 2026, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485, and the principles discussed in State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452.

The Court held that the accused’s asserted notice of 2 May 2016 and accompanying documents were only photocopies, were not put to the complainant in cross-examination, and were neither marked nor proved; they therefore could not support the defence.

The complainant’s signature on the reverse of the cheque, together with the accused’s signatures on it, supported the finding that the complainant possessed the self-cheque for consideration; its being a self-cheque did not, by itself, defeat the complaint or the statutory presumptions.

The alleged inconsistency about how long the complainant had known the accused was not material, and the accused’s cross-examination did not otherwise raise a probable defence.

The accused had neither proved a reply to the statutory notice nor led defence evidence.

The lower courts’ findings were therefore not shown to meet the threshold for revisional interference.

The High Court dismissed the revision petition, leaving undisturbed the trial court’s conviction and sentence as affirmed by the appellate court.