A stated performance date alone does not make time essential in a sale of immovable property.

The plaintiff claimed that, under a receipt/agreement dated 5 February 1980, he agreed to purchase the suit agricultural land for ₹28,501, paid ₹5,001 as earnest money and was given possession.

The receipt required the balance to be paid upon execution of the sale deed; the parties disputed whether the stipulated date was 10 April 1980 or 10 April 1981, with the plaintiff alleging that the defendant had altered the agreement and failed to complete the sale.

The plaintiff published notice of the transaction, sought necessary permissions, and issued a legal notice demanding execution of the sale deed.

The suit was initially decreed ex parte in 1995 and a sale deed was executed through the court in execution.

After the decree was set aside and the matter remanded, the trial court dismissed the suit on 22 March 2002, principally relying on evidence of a handwriting expert concerning alleged interpolation.

The plaintiff appealed under Section 96 CPC.

Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the suit resulted from misappreciation of the pleadings and evidence, including the effect of the defendant’s pleading that the plaintiff owned and possessed the land.

Whether the trial court erred in relying on the handwriting expert’s opinion and in finding that the receipt had been interpolated.

Whether the plaintiff established a valid and enforceable agreement, was continuously ready and willing to perform his obligations, and was entitled to specific performance notwithstanding the disputed performance date.

Whether the court-ordered sale deed executed pursuant to the earlier decree affected the relief to be granted and required consequential restitution under Section 144 CPC.

Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a plaintiff seeking specific performance must plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the essential contractual obligations; actual tender of money is not ordinarily required unless directed by the court.

Under the applicable Section 20, specific performance is discretionary, but discretion must be exercised judicially rather than arbitrarily.

In contracts for the sale of immovable property, time is generally not presumed to be of the essence; that presumption may be displaced by the contract’s terms, the nature of the property, or surrounding circumstances.

Expert opinion is relevant but must be assessed for expertise, reliability and corroboration; it is not conclusive by itself.

Section 144 CPC empowers the court, where a decree is reversed or varied, to order restitution so far as necessary to restore the parties to the position they would have occupied absent that decree.

The High Court found that the trial court gave undue weight to the handwriting expert’s opinion: the expert had relied on photographs, did not test the disputed initials against admitted specimens, and the report lacked adequate corroboration.

The court also considered the attesting witness’s support for the plaintiff’s account and the defendant’s pleading acknowledging the plaintiff’s ownership and possession, which the trial court had not properly addressed.

The plaintiff’s newspaper notice, requests for permissions, and legal notice were treated as evidence of readiness and willingness; the defendant had not disputed the plaintiff’s financial capacity or willingness to pay the balance.

The receipt contained no express term making time essential, and the court found that the surrounding circumstances did not justify treating the disputed date as a strict condition barring specific performance.

Finally, because the earlier decree had resulted in a court-executed sale deed, the court considered restitution under Section 144 CPC as the consequential means of addressing the parties’ position after reversal of the dismissal.

It further held that the title and possession consequences of the earlier court-executed sale deed were to be addressed through consequential action under Section 144 CPC, with the object of restoring the appellant’s position.

The trial court record was directed to be returned after necessary formalities.