A stigmatic termination of a contractual employee requires a prior regular departmental inquiry.

The petitioner was initially appointed on a contractual basis as Manager/Additional Programme Manager on 21 November 2006 and was subsequently assigned charge as Additional Programme Officer, Janpad Panchayat Mehgaon. His contractual engagement was extended from time to time, including for 2024–2025.

A show-cause notice was issued on 8 January 2024, followed by another notice dated 5 February 2025. The petitioner submitted replies dated 18 February 2024 and 21 February 2025 respectively.

Without conducting a regular departmental inquiry, the respondents terminated his contractual services by order dated 30 September 2025. The termination order attributed alleged irregular payments and failure to scrutinise MGNREGA works, and concluded that the petitioner’s reply did not satisfactorily answer the allegations.

The petitioner’s appeal was rejected on 7 April 2026.

He therefore invoked Article 226 of the Constitution, principally seeking quashing of the termination and appellate orders, reinstatement, consequential benefits, and change of cadre to the District Cadre.

Whether the petitioner’s termination, being founded on allegations of misconduct and dereliction of duty, was stigmatic and could lawfully be ordered without a charge-sheet and regular departmental inquiry?

Whether the termination order was liable to be quashed for being non-speaking, unreasoned, and passed without proper consideration of the petitioner’s reply?

Whether the appellate authority’s order could cure the defects in the original termination order?

Clause 7.2 of the MGNREGA Policy requires a preliminary assessment of serious allegations and, where warranted, a disciplinary inquiry giving the contractual employee an opportunity of hearing; the provision also contemplates suspension from official work during inquiry and consequential disciplinary action after the allegations are proved.

The Court applied the principle that a termination order founded on allegations amounting to misconduct and casting stigma on an employee’s character, conduct, or work cannot ordinarily be passed without complying with natural justice and conducting an appropriate inquiry.

It relied on Rahul Tripathi v. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission, Bhopal, 2001 (3) MPLJ 616; Jitendra v. State of M.P., 2008 (4) MPLJ 670; Malkhan Singh Malviya v. State of M.P., ILR (2018) MP 660; and Rajesh Kumar Rathore v. High Court of M.P., W.P. No. 18657/2018, for the distinction between innocuous termination and stigmatic termination.

Under Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300, reasonable opportunity includes notice of the charges, an opportunity to contest the allegations and examine evidence, and an opportunity to make a representation against the proposed punishment.

The Court further applied the requirement that administrative orders affecting rights must contain cogent reasons, relying on State of Punjab v. Bandeep Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 724, and Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496.

Under Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2010) 13 SCC 427, defects in the original decision-making process cannot be cured merely by reasons supplied in an appellate order.

The Court found that the termination order did not merely bring the contractual engagement to an end simpliciter; it expressly attributed irregular payments, failure to perform official duties, and approval of impermissible MGNREGA works to the petitioner.

These findings carried an adverse stigma and were based on disputed allegations.

Although the petitioner had submitted a reply to the show-cause notice, the respondents neither issued a formal charge-sheet nor conducted an inquiry in which the petitioner could properly contest the allegations or lead evidence.

The Court held that the requirements of Clause 7.2 and natural justice were therefore not satisfied.

It also held that the authority’s statement that the petitioner’s reply did not resolve the allegations did not constitute adequate reasons or a lawful adjudication of guilt.

Since the original termination order was procedurally defective and stigmatic, the appellate rejection could not validate it or cure the absence of an inquiry.

It accordingly set aside the termination order and the appellate rejection order dated 7 April 2026.

The respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith with consequential benefits, excluding back wages on the principle of “no work, no pay”.

The respondents were granted liberty to initiate fresh proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law, if so advised.

The petition was disposed of accordingly; the relief concerning cadre change was not separately granted or adjudicated.