A stranger claiming independent title is neither necessary nor proper party in a specific performance suit.

The petitioner, plaintiff in Other Suit No. 189 of 2018, claimed title and possession over land comprised in L.R. Plot No. 1414, asserting that he had purchased it by a registered sale deed dated 26 September 2013 from the heirs of Ajit Kumar Bandhopadhyay

He instituted Other Suit No. 189 of 2018 seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from transferring the disputed property to third parties

Subsequently, Shravan Kumar Agarwal instituted Other Suit No. 10 of 2019 against the alleged vendors, seeking specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 22 May 2019, along with injunction and alternative monetary reliefs

The petitioner alleged that the properties in both suits were identical and that the specific-performance suit was collusive and intended to prejudice his pending title claim.

He therefore applied under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) to be impleaded as a defendant in Other Suit No. 10 of 2019.

The trial court rejected the application by Order No. 13 dated 16 November 2019, holding that the petitioner was neither a necessary nor a proper party, as he was not a party to the agreement sought to be enforced

Whether a person claiming an independent title over the property, but not being a party to the agreement for sale, is a necessary or proper party to a suit for specific performance under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC

Whether the petitioner’s impleadment would impermissibly enlarge the scope of the specific-performance suit and convert it into a suit for declaration of title

Whether the trial court’s refusal to implead the petitioner warranted interference in revisional jurisdiction

Order I Rule 10(2) CPC empowers the court, in its judicial discretion, to add a person whose presence is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the questions involved in the suit; however, a person has no absolute right to be impleaded merely because he may be a proper party

In a suit for specific performance, the principal controversy is the enforceability of the contract between its parties, and a stranger claiming an independent title ordinarily cannot be added if doing so would transform the suit into one for declaration of title and possession.

This principle was laid down in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733, which distinguished between a necessary party—without whom no effective decree can be passed—and a proper party whose presence is required for complete adjudication, while holding that an independent title claimant is generally neither

The same approach was reaffirmed in Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra, (1995) 3 SCC 147, and Bharat Karsondas Thakkar v. Kiran Construction Co., (2008) 13 SCC 658

The court also considered Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 41, and J.N. Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015, recognising that impleadment of a proper party remains discretionary and fact-dependent, particularly where it would alter the nature of the suit

The petitioner was admittedly not a party to the agreement dated 22 May 2019 and claimed an independent title based on his own alleged purchase, rather than a title derived from any party to the agreement

The issues in Other Suit No. 10 of 2019 were confined to the existence, enforceability and performance of the agreement between the plaintiff and the alleged vendors; those issues could be adjudicated without the petitioner’s presence

Although J.N. Real Estate recognises that a non-party may be impleaded as a proper party where his presence would assist effective adjudication, the court noted that the facts of that case were materially different, including the plaintiff’s non-opposition and the trial court’s identification of issues directly involving the proposed party

Here, determining the petitioner’s asserted title would require adjudication of a distinct and independent controversy already pending in Other Suit No. 189 of 2018.

His impleadment would therefore enlarge the specific-performance suit and convert it into a title action, contrary to the principles in Kasturi and the other authorities relied upon

The pendency of the petitioner’s separate title suit did not make him a necessary party to the contractual dispute.

His addition would alter the nature and character of the suit by introducing a title dispute.

The trial court’s Order No. 13 dated 16 November 2019 was therefore affirmed, and C.O. No. 2013 of 2021 was dismissed without costs.

Connected applications, if any, were disposed of, and any subsisting stay order was vacated