A stranger to an arbitration agreement cannot seek impleadment in Section 9 proceedings to assert independent contractual rights.

In brief

The question

1. Whether a third party, who is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement, can be impleaded in proceedings instituted under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

The court held

The Court held that a third party cannot be permitted to "enter the house of arbitration through its window when the doors stand closed both by statute as well as by consensual arrangement" and that the Applicant disclosed no legal basis for intervention as it was not a party to the underlying arbitration agreement.

It also directed

The Court dismissed the impleadment application (I.A. No. 11046/2026) and connected applications, and issued separate directions to Respondent No. 1 to file disclosure affidavits regarding commercial transactions and receivables as previously undertaken.

01Facts

The Petitioner filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking interim protection regarding media and commercial rights for the "Legends League Cricket Masters T20"

p. 3

On 18.03.2026, the Court granted an ad-interim injunction restraining Respondent No. 1 from creating third-party rights or transferring said media rights

¶ 4

Subsequently, an applicant, Avro Commercial Company Pvt. Ltd., filed I.A. No. 11046/2026 seeking impleadment

¶ 1

The Applicant claimed to be a secured creditor of Respondent No. 1 by virtue of a separate Loan and Hypothecation Agreement dated 20.04.2024, asserting that the Court’s stay order materially prejudiced its security interest in the assets and receivables of Respondent No. 1

¶ 5-7

02Issues

i.1. Whether a third party, who is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement, can be impleaded in proceedings instituted under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

¶ 12/18

ii.2. Whether the presence of a common party and an incidental effect on commercial interests of a stranger are sufficient grounds for impleadment in an interim arbitral relief petition

¶ 22/33

03Law Applied

The Court applied Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which governs interim measures by the court, read with the definition of "party" under Section 2(h), which strictly limits the term to a signatory of an arbitration agreement.

¶ 16, 17

The Court relied on National Highways Authority of India v. China Coal Construction Group Corpn., establishing that a stranger to the contract has no locus standi in Section 9 proceedings.

¶ 44

It further applied Vijay Arvind Jariwala v. Umang Jatin Gandhi, which holds that Section 9 measures operate only between parties to the arbitration.

¶ 46

Distinguished Mohammad Ishaq Bhat v. Tariq Ahmad Sofi, noting that impleadment of strangers is only permissible in "exceptional circumstances" involving prior judicial orders.

¶ 42

The Court noted that Order I Rule 8A of the CPC is intended for public interest questions of law, not private commercial interventions.

¶ 50

Provisions in the judgment · 9 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 151

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 2 Section 7 Section 9 Section 11 Section 17 Section 36 Section 37

Indian Partnership Act, 1932 Section 69

04Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the statutory architecture of the A&C Act is "fundamentally anchored" to disputes between parties to the arbitration agreement.

¶ 18

It observed that Section 9 is an "ancillary, preservative, and protective" remedy intended to secure the subject matter of arbitration, not a forum to adjudicate substantive rival claims of third parties.

¶ 19-20

The Court found that the Applicant’s claims arose from a separate Loan Agreement which contained its own independent arbitration clause; thus, the Applicant should invoke its own contractual remedies rather than intervening in a separate lis.

¶ 29, 30

Allowing such impleadment would "open the floodgates" to collateral interventions, transforming summary proceedings into complex adjudications of title and priority, thereby defeating the legislative intent of "procedural expedition" and "minimal judicial interference".

¶ 21, 31, 48