A subsequent demand notice does not negate abandonment established by continued non-response and absence.

The Appellant joined the Respondent-management as a Guard on 01.01.1996.

He alleged that his duties were subsequently changed to Thread Cutter and Layer Man without payment of additional wages and that, after he demanded extra wages, the Management obtained his signatures on blank papers and assaulted him on 15.07.2005, compelling him to write an apology.

He further alleged that he was thereafter prevented from joining duty and was effectively terminated without notice, notice pay, retrenchment compensation, or a chargesheet.

The Appellant filed a claim petition seeking reinstatement, continuity of service, and full back wages.

The Labour Court dismissed the claim by award dated 13.07.2018, holding that the Appellant had remained unauthorisedly absent from 16.07.2005 and had deliberately abandoned his service.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the Appellant’s writ petition on 28.03.2026, holding that the Labour Court’s findings were not perverse.

The present intra-court appeal challenged that judgment.

The delay of 30 days in filing and 18 days in re-filing the appeal was condoned.

Whether the Appellant’s absence from duty amounted to voluntary abandonment of service, or whether he had been prevented from joining duty by the Management.

Whether the Appellant’s demand notice dated 21.07.2005 was sufficient to establish his intention to resume service and negate abandonment.

Whether the Management’s communications sent through Under Postal Certificate, and allegedly to an incorrect address, invalidated the finding of abandonment.

Whether the Labour Court’s finding of abandonment was perverse and liable to interference in writ or intra-court appellate jurisdiction.

Voluntary abandonment of service is determined from the employee’s intention, which must be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and overall conduct; it is a question of fact.

The Court relied on G.T. Lad & Ors. v. Chemical & Fibres of India Ltd., (1979) 1 SCC 590, which recognises that intention is essential to abandonment and that the issue must be decided on the facts of each case.

Rule 18 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 governs notices, summons, processes, or orders issued by adjudicatory authorities, and does not prescribe the mode of service for communications issued by the Management.

Findings of fact by the Labour Court are not to be disturbed in writ or intra-court appellate jurisdiction unless they are perverse or unsupported by the record.

The Court held that the Management had sent recall letters dated 18.07.2005 and 02.09.2005, as well as a chargesheet dated 10.10.2005, to the address furnished by the Appellant in his apology letter dated 15.07.2005.

The Appellant neither responded to those communications nor reported for duty thereafter.

Although the demand notice dated 21.07.2005 indicated an initial assertion of willingness to resume work, it had to be assessed alongside the Appellant’s subsequent conduct.

His failure to answer the recall letters or make any further attempt to join duty demonstrated an intention to abandon service.

The Enquiry Officer’s statement that certain communications were returned related to communications issued during the domestic enquiry and did not displace the evidence concerning the earlier recall letters.

The objection regarding UPC service was rejected because Rule 18 did not apply to Management communications and, in any event, did not affect the factual finding of abandonment.

The Court distinguished G.T. Lad, as that case concerned absence arising from a peaceful strike, whereas the present case depended on the Appellant’s individual conduct and failure to return to work.

Accordingly, the Labour Court’s finding was a permissible finding of fact and was not perverse.

The demand notice dated 21.07.2005 did not outweigh his subsequent failure to respond to the recall letters or report for duty.

The Court found no ground to interfere with the Labour Court’s award dated 13.07.2018 or the learned Single Judge’s judgment dated 28.03.2026.

The appeal was dismissed, pending applications were disposed of, and no order as to costs was made.