A subsequent purchaser cannot challenge acquisition proceedings finalized before the purchase.

The petitioner claimed title to and possession of a property forming part of Sy. No. 36/1, Krishnaiahanapalya, purchased in 1992—after the BDA’s preliminary and final acquisition notifications issued in 1984 and 1986.

She asserted that she had constructed a building on the property and that compensation had not been paid and possession had not been taken; on that basis, she sought a declaration that the acquisition had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

The BDA contended that the petitioner was a subsequent purchaser, that an award had been passed and possession taken, and that Section 24(2) did not apply to an acquisition under the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976.

Whether the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act in respect of the schedule property.

Whether the petitioner, as a purchaser after the acquisition notifications, could challenge the acquisition, and whether she could seek relief under Section 38D of the BDA Act.

Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act was invoked as the basis for the petitioner’s claim that acquisition had lapsed due to non-payment of compensation and failure to take possession.

The court relied on Shivkumar and another v. Union of India and others, (2019) 10 SCC 229, for the principle that a subsequent purchaser of notified land cannot challenge the acquisition, because the purchaser’s rights are subservient to the State’s interest.

The court also applied Section 38D of the BDA Act as a potential route for the petitioner to seek consideration of her claimed occupation, subject to verification of the property and her eligibility.

The petitioner acquired the property in 1992, after the acquisition process had reached finality through the 1986 final notification and an award.

Applying Shivkumar, the court held that her status as a subsequent purchaser prevented her from using her purchase or claimed possession to invalidate the acquisition; construction on the land did not alter that conclusion.

However, because she claimed to be in possession, the court permitted her to apply under Section 38D, leaving the BDA to inspect the site and determine whether the construction was on the acquired land and whether she qualified for that provision.

It permitted the petitioner to apply to the BDA under Section 38D within one month, directed the BDA to decide the application within three months thereafter, and restrained the BDA and the Special Land Acquisition Officer from taking precipitative action against the construction, if any, until then.