A subsequent sale deed cannot confer title to property already conveyed under an earlier registered deed.

The appellant-plaintiff claimed ownership and possession of 586 square yards comprising Plots Nos. 61 and 62 out of Khasra No. 17/11, Village Nangli Sakrawati, Delhi, under a registered sale deed dated 5 January 1984 executed by Respondents Nos. 2–10 through their attorney, Narain Singh.

She alleged that, after constructing a boundary wall up to plinth level, she was forcibly dispossessed by the defendants on 1 July 1988 and consequently sought possession and permanent injunction.

Respondent No. 1 contested the suit, relying on an earlier registered sale deed dated 11 September 1974, under which he claimed to have purchased the property and obtained possession.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the property covered by her 1984 sale deed was distinct from the property covered by the defendant’s prior sale deed.

The First Appellate Court affirmed the decision on 28 April 2014.

The plaintiff thereafter filed the present Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC.

1. Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below were perverse or unsupported by the pleadings and evidence, thereby giving rise to a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC?

2. Whether the plaintiff’s registered sale deed dated 5 January 1984 conferred a valid title superior to the defendant’s earlier registered sale deed dated 11 September 1974?

3. Whether the plaintiff established that the property described in her sale deed as 586 square yards out of Khasra No. 17/11 corresponded to Plots Nos. 61 and 62 and was different from the property covered by the defendant’s sale deed?

4. Whether, in view of the cloud over the plaintiff’s title, the suit for possession was maintainable without seeking a declaration of title and cancellation of the defendant’s earlier sale deed?

Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a Regular Second Appeal lies only where a substantial question of law arises; concurrent findings of fact ordinarily cannot be disturbed in the absence of perversity or legal error.

A prior registered sale deed conveying the same property ordinarily prevails over a subsequent sale deed, and a purchaser cannot acquire a better title than that possessed by the vendor.

Where the plaintiff’s title is under a cloud because of a competing title document, the plaintiff must seek appropriate declaratory relief and, where necessary, cancellation of the adverse instrument rather than merely suing for possession; the Court relied on Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594.

The Court found that the defendant’s registered sale deed dated 11 September 1974 substantially preceded the plaintiff’s sale deed dated 5 January 1984.

The two sale deeds contained material inconsistencies regarding the names of the heirs of Neki Ram, and the 1984 deed referred to an unproduced relinquishment deed while inconsistently describing Gopali as a daughter rather than Neki Ram’s wife.

Unlike the plaintiff’s deed, which did not specify plot numbers, the defendant’s deed identified Plots Nos. 80, 81, 89 and 90, their measurements, and surrounding boundaries.

The plaintiff’s separate, undated declaration identifying her property as Plots Nos. 61 and 62 was considered unreliable, and the oral evidence of her witnesses and the Local Commissioner’s report did not independently establish the identity or distinctness of the property.

Since the plaintiff failed to prove that her property was different from, or superior to, the property covered by the defendant’s prior deed, the concurrent findings were neither perverse nor legally erroneous.

Further, the plaintiff had not sought declaration of title or cancellation of the earlier sale deed despite the cloud on her title.

It held that the plaintiff failed to establish a valid title superior to the defendant’s prior registered title or to prove the distinct identity of the suit property.

No substantial question of law arose under Section 100 CPC, and the concurrent findings of the courts below disclosed no perversity.

The Regular Second Appeal was dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.