A suit challenging MRTP development permissions without seeking title declaration is barred under Section 149.

Applicants, the original Defendant Nos. 4 to 6, claimed rights under a 999-year lease and subsequent assignments concerning land at Pali Road, Bandra, including the right to utilise balance FSI.

A twelve-storey building, “White Orchid,” was constructed on the leased portion after development permissions were granted by the Municipal Corporation.

Kakad Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. filed LC Suit No. 2591 of 2000 seeking, inter alia, declarations that the building plans, development permissions, commencement certificate and other sanctions were illegal, their cancellation, and demolition of the building.

The Applicants sought rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, contending that the suit was barred by Section 149 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (“MRTP Act”).

The City Civil Court rejected the application on 14 July 2009, principally treating it as belated and considering the title-related allegations in the plaint; the Applicants thereafter invoked revisional jurisdiction.

Whether a suit seeking cancellation of municipal development permissions, sanctioned building plans, commencement certificates and consequential demolition of a structure is barred by Section 149 of the MRTP Act and liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC?

Whether references to the Plaintiff-Society’s alleged title in the plaint, without seeking a declaration of title or possession, prevent application of the statutory bar under Section 149 of the MRTP Act?

Whether the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC could be considered after framing of issues and despite the Applicants’ failure to raise the statutory bar in their written statement?

Whether the challenge to the ULC permission survived after repeal of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976?

The Court applied Section 149 of the MRTP Act, which gives finality to orders, directions and notices issued by the State Government, Regional Board, Planning Authority or Development Authority under the Act and expressly bars their challenge in a civil suit.

It applied Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, under which a plaint must be rejected where the suit appears from its statements to be barred by law.

The Court relied on Arihant Construction v. Subhash Kesharmal Barlota, holding that a suit which merely challenges development permission and seeks consequential relief, without seeking declaration of title or possession, is barred by Section 149.

Sujala Yashwant Nitsure v. Municipal Corporation of City of Pune establishes that development permission constitutes an order under the MRTP Act and that Section 149 creates a general bar against civil suits challenging such orders.

Roha Municipal Council v. Shahin Mohamed Akbar Alekar and Juhi Infra Build LLP v. Yasin Mahamudiya Patel require a meaningful reading of the plaint and prevent clever drafting from disguising a barred challenge to statutory orders.

Consequential relief cannot survive when the principal relief is barred, as recognised in Prashant Dattatraya Wazalwar v. Sudha Baburao Lokhande.

Under Church of Christ Charitable Trust v. Ponniamman Educational Trust and ITC Ltd. v. DRAT, an application under Order VII Rule 11 may be considered at any stage before conclusion of trial, and framing of issues does not prevent its determination.

The Court also applied Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, under which pending proceedings relating to orders under the repealed ULC Act abate.

The Court found that the substance of the suit was a direct challenge to the development permissions, sanctioned plans, commencement certificate and other municipal approvals for White Orchid.

Prayers seeking demolition, removal of the paved platform and disconnection of water supply were merely consequential to the principal challenge and therefore could not independently survive once the principal relief was barred.

Although the plaint referred to the Society’s title and ownership history, it sought neither a declaration of title nor recovery of possession; such averments could not transform a “plain vanilla” challenge to statutory permissions into a title suit.

The Court further held that the bar under Section 149 concerned subject-matter jurisdiction and could not be waived by failure to plead it in the written statement.

The application was not belated because Order VII Rule 11 could be invoked at any stage before decree, including after framing of issues.

The pending amendment application also did not require postponement of the Order VII Rule 11 determination, since the plaint had to be assessed on its existing averments and reliefs.

Finally, the ULC-related relief had abated because the ULC Act had been repealed and the repeal had been adopted in Maharashtra.

It held that the suit, being a direct challenge to development permissions and related statutory orders without any prayer for declaration of title or possession, was expressly barred by Section 149 of the MRTP Act.

The application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was consequently allowed, and the plaint in LC Suit No. 2591 of 2000 was rejected; the suit was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

The Interim Applications were disposed of as infructuous.