A suspension order ordinarily cannot be quashed after disciplinary proceedings culminate in enquiry findings.

The first respondent, an employee/Secretary of the appellant Co-operative Society, challenged proceedings dated 07.09.2021 by which he was placed under suspension, seeking certiorarified mandamus to quash the proceedings.

The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, treating the proceedings dated 07.09.2021 as a charge memo and holding that its contents were verbatim identical to an earlier charge memo dated 31.05.2021; the Court consequently found the subsequent proceedings to have been issued without reference to the earlier charge memo and with mala fide intent.

During the pendency of the appeal, a regular charge memo was issued, the respondent submitted his statement of defence, an Enquiry Officer was appointed, disciplinary proceedings were conducted, and findings were returned.

1. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the proceedings dated 07.09.2021 on the basis that they constituted a duplicative and mala fide charge memo.

2. Whether an order of suspension could be quashed when the subsequent disciplinary proceedings had already progressed to the stage of completion of enquiry and submission of findings.

3. Whether the validity of the suspension order had to be examined independently from the validity or contents of the charge memo.

The Court applied the principle that an order of suspension ordinarily should not be quashed at the threshold, particularly where disciplinary proceedings are proposed or are already underway; the normal course is to permit disciplinary proceedings to continue when the explanation to the charge memo is found unsatisfactory.

Interference with or quashing of a suspension order is warranted only in an extremely rare circumstance.

The Court further applied the procedural distinction between an order of suspension and a charge memo, holding that the legality of the suspension must be assessed as the issue actually challenged, and not by treating it as a challenge to the contents or duplication of the charge memo.

No specific statutory provision or judicial precedent was cited in the judgment.

The learned Single Judge proceeded on the premise that the proceedings dated 07.09.2021 were a charge memo and focused on their alleged identity with the earlier charge memo dated 31.05.2021.

The Division Bench held that the challenged proceedings were, in substance, an order of suspension, and that the issue before the Single Judge was the validity of the suspension rather than the merits or wording of the charge memo.

Since a regular charge memo had subsequently been issued, a defence had been filed, an enquiry had been conducted, and findings had been returned, the suspension order no longer survived independently and had merged into the subsequent disciplinary process.

In the absence of an extremely rare circumstance warranting judicial interference, the disciplinary proceedings were required to be allowed to take their course.

It held that the learned Single Judge had incorrectly proceeded on the basis that the disputed proceedings were a charge memo, whereas the actual subject matter was an order of suspension.

The order dated 14.11.2024 in W.P.(MD) No.22296 of 2022 was set aside, the writ appeal was allowed, and no costs were imposed.

The connected miscellaneous petition was closed.