A ten-day delay in reporting child sexual assault is not fatal when the victim’s testimony remains credible.

The appellant, a 61-year-old neighbour of the twelve-year-old victim, allegedly took her to his house on the pretext of giving her guava fruits, locked the door, removed her clothes, and inserted his finger into her vagina.

He allegedly threatened to kill her and throw her into a well if she disclosed the incident.

The occurrence was alleged to have taken place on 7 December 2019, while the First Information Statement was recorded on 16 December 2019 and the FIR was registered on 17 December 2019.

The victim’s friend, teacher, mother, medical officer, police officers, and other witnesses were examined during trial.

The Special Court convicted the accused under Sections 342 and 376AB of the IPC and Sections 5(m) read with 6(1) and 3(b) read with 4(1) of the POCSO Act, while acquitting him of the remaining charges, and imposed a twenty-year sentence under Section 5(m) read with Section 6(1) of the POCSO Act, with concurrent sentences.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused wrongfully confined the victim, constituting an offence under Section 342 of the IPC.

Whether the prosecution proved the offence punishable under Section 376AB of the IPC.

Whether the accused committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 5(m) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

Whether the prosecution proved penetrative sexual assault under Section 3(b) read with Section 4(1) of the POCSO Act.

Whether the alleged delay in lodging the FIR, discrepancies in the victim’s testimony, the medical finding that the hymen was intact, and the alleged failure to prove the accused’s potency created reasonable doubt warranting appellate interference.

The Court applied Sections 342, 376AB, and 71 of the IPC, and Sections 2(d), 3(b), 4(1), 5(m), 6(1), and 42 of the POCSO Act.

A child victim’s credible and trustworthy testimony can, by itself, sustain a conviction without independent eyewitness corroboration; however, it must be scrutinised to determine whether it is reliable and consistent with probability.

The Court relied on Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat for the principle that corroboration is ordinarily unnecessary in sexual-offence cases where the victim’s testimony is credible.

Minor discrepancies concerning peripheral details do not discredit testimony where the core allegation remains intact.

Delay in reporting a sexual offence, particularly by a child, is not automatically fatal if the surrounding circumstances reasonably explain it.

The Court further held that an admissible document, such as a potency certificate, tendered without objection cannot ordinarily be challenged for want of formal proof for the first time in appeal, where the opposing party thereby denied the prosecution an opportunity to examine the author.

The child’s age was established through school and birth records, satisfying the statutory requirement under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act.

The Court found the victim’s account materially consistent: the accused lured her to his house, confined her, subjected her to digital penetration, and threatened her against disclosure.

Her evidence was supported by the contemporaneous disclosure to her friend, her later disclosure to her teacher, and the surrounding testimony regarding her distressed condition.

The ten-day delay was attributed to the victim’s age, fear, and the accused’s threat; although the precise explanation was not stated in the earliest police statement, the Court held that the delay was not fatal in the circumstances of a sexual assault against a twelve-year-old child.

The discrepancies regarding the number of chairs and the manner in which the victim was undressed were treated as immaterial variations relating to peripheral details and not to the substance of the assault.

The fact that the hymen was intact did not disprove digital penetration, and the Court considered the victim’s testimony sufficient notwithstanding the absence of decisive medical corroboration.

The victim’s date of birth was established through the school admission register and birth certificate, proving that she was a child at the time of occurrence.

Finally, the challenge to the potency certificate was rejected because no objection had been raised when it was admitted through the investigating officer and the accused had not disputed his potency before the Special Court.

The conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Court, including the twenty-year rigorous imprisonment and fine under Section 5(m) read with Section 6(1) of the POCSO Act, were confirmed.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Registry was directed to forward the judgment to the Special Court.