A third party claiming independent rights is not necessary in a specific performance suit.

The respondents/plaintiffs instituted O.S. No. 46 of 2012 before the Sub Court, Sankari, seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale concerning the suit schedule property.

The petitioner, who was not a party to that agreement, sought impleadment on the basis of a separate pipeline agreement allegedly entered into with the father of the original owner, claiming rights connected with the same property.

The petitioner had also instituted separate proceedings concerning the pipeline agreement; that suit was dismissed on 30 November 2022, although an appeal was stated to be pending.

The trial Court dismissed the petitioner’s impleadment application, I.A. No. 2 of 2023, holding that he had no privity of contract with the parties, was neither a necessary nor proper party, and could pursue an independent remedy.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether a third party claiming rights under a separate agreement concerning the suit property can be impleaded in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale to which that third party is not a party?

Whether the petitioner’s presence was necessary for the effective and complete adjudication of the specific-performance suit?

Whether the trial Court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s application for impleadment on the ground that the petitioner had no privity of contract with the parties to the suit?

The Court applied the principle that a suit for specific performance is ordinarily concerned with the enforceability of the agreement of sale and the parties’ readiness and willingness to perform their contractual obligations; it is not a suit for adjudication of title.

Relying principally on Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733, the Court held that collateral disputes involving title or rights of non-parties should not be introduced so as to convert a specific-performance suit into a complicated title action.

The Court also applied the impleadment principles referred to in Thomas Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397, namely, that a person may be impleaded only where the person’s presence is necessary for the effective and complete adjudication of the issues in the suit.

The decision in Lagrave Jayaseeli v. Trinite Modestine, 2018 (5) CTC 401, concerning a subsequent purchaser, was distinguished on facts.

The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 was therefore not invoked to interfere with the trial Court’s order.

The petitioner had no contractual relationship with either the plaintiffs or defendants under the agreement of sale forming the subject matter of O.S. No. 46 of 2012.

His claim arose instead from a separate pipeline agreement with a third party and involved an alleged right over or concerning the suit property.

Determination of that claim was not necessary to decide whether the parties to the sale agreement were ready and willing to perform their respective obligations.

Impleading the petitioner would introduce a collateral dispute regarding rights in the property and risk transforming the specific-performance suit into a title or rights-based action between contracting parties and non-parties, which is impermissible under Kasturi.

Since the petitioner had already pursued an independent suit concerning the pipeline agreement, his interests could be worked out in those proceedings rather than in the specific-performance suit.

Accordingly, he was neither a necessary nor a proper party under the principles stated in Thomas Press.

The petitioner’s presence was unnecessary for adjudicating the plaintiffs’ entitlement to specific performance, and the trial Court had correctly dismissed I.A. No. 2 of 2023.

The Civil Revision Petition was dismissed, with no order as to costs, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.