A third-party employee lacks locus standi to seek disciplinary action against a co-employee.

The applicant, a Public Relations Assistant in the Directorate of Information and Publicity, Puducherry, challenged the continued service and likely promotion of Respondent No. 3, a Sub-Editor, alleging that he had secured appointment in 2001 by relying on a false experience certificate issued by the publication “Pon-Ka-Ma-Ya”.

The applicant alleged that the publication was not properly registered and that Respondent No. 3’s claimed journalism experience overlapped with his regular undergraduate and postgraduate studies.

He submitted a complaint to the Director of Information and Publicity on 24 February 2020, seeking action against Respondent No. 3.

The complaint, along with similar complaints, was referred to the Chief Vigilance Officer, who returned them to the Department for appropriate disposal; the Department thereafter treated the complaints as closed and filed.

The applicant claimed that Respondent No. 3 stood third and he stood fifth in the inter-se seniority list for promotion to Assistant Director, and that Respondent No. 3’s promotion would prejudice his promotional prospects.

The respondents maintained that Respondent No. 3 had been selected through a competitive examination after production and verification of his original certificates, and that the publication had obtained title clearance from the Registrar of Newspapers for India.

Whether the applicant, as a third-party employee, had the locus standi and a legally enforceable right to seek a direction concerning disciplinary or vigilance action against Respondent No. 3.

Whether the Tribunal could direct the Department to reopen or act upon the applicant’s complaint dated 24 February 2020 alleging that Respondent No. 3 had obtained appointment through a false experience certificate.

Whether the Department’s decision to close and file the complaint was arbitrary or otherwise warranted interference by the Tribunal.

The application was considered under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which permits an aggrieved person to invoke the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to service matters.

The Tribunal applied the principle that a stranger or third party cannot maintain a public-interest challenge before an Administrative Tribunal merely to seek disciplinary or vigilance action against another employee when the applicant’s own statutory rights are not directly infringed.

It relied on Dr. Duryodhan Sahu & Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra & Ors. , order dated 25 August 1998, for the proposition that an Administrative Tribunal cannot entertain public-interest litigation at the instance of a stranger.

The Tribunal also considered the recruitment-rule requirement of at least one year’s experience in journalism for appointment as Sub-Editor, together with the recruitment process and verification of original certificates.

The Tribunal found that Respondent No. 3 had been selected through a competitive examination, declared eligible after scrutiny of his certificates, recommended by the Recruitment Committee, and appointed as Sub-Editor in 2001.

The respondents’ material indicated that the experience certificate related to work performed during 1993–1994 and that the publication had obtained RNI title clearance and was subsequently deblocked, thereby undermining the applicant’s allegation that the certificate was necessarily false.

The Tribunal further observed that the applicant had been appointed in the same recruitment exercise and had not questioned Respondent No. 3’s appointment for approximately nineteen years, which suggested that the application was motivated by the applicant’s own promotional interests rather than a bona fide public or service grievance.

Since the complaint had already been examined, referred to the Chief Vigilance Officer, returned for departmental disposal, and thereafter closed by the competent departmental authority, the Tribunal found no sufficient ground to interfere.

It further held that the Department had adequately dealt with the complaint and that its decision to close and file the matter did not warrant judicial interference.

The Original Application was dismissed as devoid of merit, with no order as to costs.