A tribunal cannot reduce dismissal for proven banking misconduct absent shocking disproportionality.

Venkatesh, an Office Assistant at the Bank’s Hiremannapur Branch, was dismissed after a domestic enquiry found him responsible for irregularities involving the collection and crediting of cheque proceeds to accounts other than those of the named beneficiaries.

The CGIT held the enquiry fair and proper but, under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, set aside the dismissal and ordered reinstatement without back wages, allowing continuity of service only for terminal benefits; it relied in part on the absence of established financial loss and the lesser punishment imposed on the Branch Managers.

The Bank challenged the award, while Venkatesh separately sought reinstatement with back wages and consequential benefits.

1. Whether the CGIT was justified in interfering under Section 11-A with the Bank’s dismissal order and directing reinstatement.

2. Whether the lesser punishment imposed on the Branch Managers, or the absence of established actual financial loss to the Bank, justified reducing Venkatesh’s punishment.

Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 empowers the Labour Court or Tribunal to interfere with a punishment, but the court held that such interference was not justified merely because another view on punishment was possible; the punishment must be shockingly disproportionate to the proved misconduct.

Relying on Punjab & Sind Bank v. Raj Kumar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 519, and the authorities discussed there—including Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Union of India v. G. Ganayutham—the Court reiterated that judicial review of disciplinary punishment is limited and ordinarily does not permit substitution of the reviewing court’s view for that of the disciplinary authority; interference is warranted where the punishment is irrational, perverse or so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience.

The Court also applied the principle that parity in punishment is not automatic where employees’ roles and responsibilities differ.

The Court noted that the CGIT had accepted the fairness of the enquiry and had not set aside the findings that Venkatesh participated in irregular cheque processing and facilitated credits to accounts other than those of the intended beneficiaries.

The absence of proof that the Bank ultimately suffered the full alleged loss did not negate the proved misconduct or the financial risk to which the Bank had been exposed.

Nor did the Managers’ lesser punishment establish a right to parity, since their circumstances and roles were not identical to Venkatesh’s.

Given the nature of the misconduct and the trust attached to banking duties, the dismissal was not shockingly disproportionate; the CGIT therefore lacked sufficient basis to substitute reinstatement.