A valid chain of delegation satisfies the Water Act’s complaint-authorization requirement.

The Karnataka State Pollution Control Board (KSPCB), through its Deputy Environmental Officer (DEO), filed a private complaint alleging offences under Sections 41–44 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Section 37 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. The Magistrate registered the matter as C.C. No. 5648/2020 and issued summons.

The petitioners sought to quash the proceedings, contending that the DEO lacked authority to initiate the prosecution without specific authorisation from the Board or its Chairman.

Whether the DEO’s complaint was maintainable under Section 49(1)(a) of the Water Act where the Board had delegated authority to its Chairman, who then authorised the DEO to initiate proceedings.

Whether a separate authorisation directly from the Board in favour of the DEO was required.

Section 49(1)(a) of the Water Act bars a court from taking cognizance of an offence except on a complaint by the Board or an officer authorised in that behalf by the Board.

An officer’s authority may be traced through a valid chain of delegation; the provision does not invariably require a separate, direct authorisation from the Board to the officer filing the complaint.

In Sri B.V. Byre Gowda v. State of Karnataka, the Court held that an officer must comply with any condition or limitation attached to a delegation, including a requirement for prior approval.

In Gujarat Pollution Control Board v. Nicosulf Industries & Exports Private Limited, the Supreme Court held that, in the context of the Water Act, sanction to file a complaint may in law amount to authorisation; a separate document bearing that title is not invariably necessary.

The Board’s resolutions and Official Memoranda dated 24 March 2007 and 8 March 2013 empowered the Chairman to grant administrative approval for criminal proceedings. The Chairman’s letter dated 5 October 2019 authorised the relevant regional officers, including the DEO, to initiate proceedings.

The DEO’s authority was therefore traceable through the Chairman to the Board, and the record disclosed no prohibition on the delegation or evidence that the Chairman exceeded it.

Unlike Byre Gowda, the required Chairman’s approval had been granted; Nicosulf Industries did not require an additional, separately titled authorisation.

It dismissed the criminal petition, reserving the petitioners’ liberty to raise other available defences before the trial court.