A voluntary, medically certified magistrate-recorded dying declaration can sustain conviction despite inconsistent subsequent statements.

Manisha Sharma was married to Kamlesh Sharma in 2003 and allegedly faced prolonged matrimonial disputes and harassment at her matrimonial home. On 27 October 2015, she sustained extensive burn injuries at her residence. The prosecution alleged that Vimal Sharma, Malti Devi, Shambhu Sharma and Sarita Devi assaulted her, poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire. She was initially admitted to Civil Hospital, Lucknow, where an Executive Magistrate recorded her dying declaration on 28 October 2015 after medical certification of her fitness. She was later shifted to Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, and died on 4 November 2015 from septicemic shock caused by infected ante-mortem flame burns covering approximately 80% of her body.

The prosecution relied principally on the Magistrate-recorded dying declaration, statements attributed to the deceased under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the testimony of her brother and neighbouring witnesses, medical evidence, and forensic evidence confirming kerosene traces on the burnt clothes and ash. The Trial Court convicted Vimal Sharma, Malti Devi and Sarita Devi under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, while acquitting Shambhu Sharma. Sarita Devi and Malti Devi challenged their convictions in the connected appeals.

1. Whether the Trial Court legally erred in relying upon the Magistrate-recorded dying declaration despite alleged inconsistencies between it and the deceased’s other statements?

2. Whether the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that Sarita Devi and Malti Devi shared a common intention with the other accused to cause Manisha Sharma’s death, thereby attracting Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC?

3. Whether the appellants’ defence of self-immolation, separate residence and absence from the scene created reasonable doubt regarding their involvement?

The Court applied Sections 302 and 34 IPC concerning murder and acts done in furtherance of common intention, and Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. governing appeals against conviction.

In relation to dying declarations, the Court referred to Section 26 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, corresponding to Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, under which a statement by a deceased person concerning the cause or circumstances of death is relevant.

A voluntary, truthful and medically reliable dying declaration may by itself sustain a conviction; however, where multiple declarations exist, they must be scrutinised for material inconsistencies, reliability, fitness of mind and possible tutoring.

Relying on Mohan Lal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700, and Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2024) 13 SCC 660, the Court held that the earliest or Magistrate-recorded declaration may be preferred where it is trustworthy and free from suspicion, while other evidence may be used for corroboration.

The Court also referred to Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 17 SCC 735, for the principle that corroboration is a rule of prudence and not an absolute legal requirement.

The Court treated the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate as the legally significant statement because it was made after the attending doctor certified that Manisha was conscious, oriented and fit to give evidence, and the doctor again certified her fitness after the recording.

Although the Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement and the account narrated to the informant attributed somewhat different roles to the accused, the Court held that these variations did not discredit the Magistrate-recorded declaration, particularly because the latter was recorded independently and without relatives present.

The declaration consistently implicated Vimal Sharma and Malti Devi in pouring kerosene and setting the deceased on fire, while identifying Sarita Devi as the person who brought the kerosene; the Court regarded the differences concerning the precise individual acts as insufficient to create reasonable doubt.

The medical evidence established that the death resulted from extensive ante-mortem flame burns, and the forensic evidence confirmed kerosene on the recovered articles, thereby corroborating the prosecution’s account and excluding the theory that the injuries were fabricated.

The evidence of the neighbouring witnesses showed that the deceased emerged from the house engulfed in flames and that the accused were absent when the neighbours arrived, which the Court considered consistent with their having fled after the occurrence rather than proof of innocence.

The alleged separate residence was also rejected as a defence because the other house was only a few houses away.

On the totality of the evidence, the Court found the appellants’ participation and common intention proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court found no illegality, infirmity or perversity in the Trial Court’s judgment convicting Sarita Devi and Malti Devi under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentencing each to life imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000, with six months’ additional rigorous imprisonment in default. Both criminal appeals were dismissed, the convictions and sentences were affirmed, and the pending bail applications were also dismissed.