Cognizance against a government servant without Section 197 CrPC sanction is unsustainable.

The petitioner-complainant alleged that Rahul Kumar @ Rahul, then serving as Circle Officer, Nokha, acted in collusion with private persons in a dispute concerning mutation, measurement, and possession of agricultural land.

The complainant claimed that, on 25 February 2016, the accused abused and assaulted him and a witness, confined them with the assistance of office staff, forcibly took ₹4,100 from the complainant and ₹1,100 from the witness, and threatened them with implication in criminal cases.

On the basis of the complaint and inquiry evidence, the jurisdictional Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Sections 323, 341, and 379 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused public servant.

The accused preferred a revision under Sections 397 read with 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Revisional Court set aside the cognizance order on the ground that previous sanction under Section 197(1)(b) CrPC had not been obtained.

Whether cognizance could be taken against the accused, a serving Circle Officer, without previous sanction under Section 197(1)(b) CrPC?

Whether the Revisional Court erred in setting aside the cognizance order on the ground that the alleged acts were connected with the accused’s official position?

Section 197(1)(b) CrPC requires previous governmental sanction before a court takes cognizance of an offence allegedly committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty.

The Court also referred to Suneeti Toteja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 433, in support of the legal position concerning the requirement of sanction in proceedings against a public servant.

The Court noted that the accused was a government servant and that cognizance had been taken against him without obtaining prior sanction under Section 197(1)(b) CrPC.

Although the petitioner argued that the alleged assault, confinement, and snatching of money were acts outside the accused’s official capacity, and that sanction could be obtained at a later stage, the Court did not accept those submissions as a ground for interference.

Relying on the requirement of sanction and the legal report cited in Suneeti Toteja, the Court held that the Revisional Court had rightly set aside the Magistrate’s cognizance order for want of sanction.

It found no reason to interfere with the Revisional Court’s order setting aside the cognizance order and dismissed the quashing application as devoid of merit.

The Trial Court Record, if any, was directed to be returned to the learned trial court along with a copy of the judgment.