A voluntary, truthful dying declaration from a mentally fit victim can solely sustain conviction.

The appellants, Kaushilya Yadav and Sunil Kumar @ Damodar Yadav, were convicted by the Sessions Judge, Janjgir Champa, under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment with fine, for causing the death of Sudama Bai by burning her.

The deceased sustained extensive burn injuries at her matrimonial house on 29 April 2019 and died during treatment at CIMS, Bilaspur, on 2 May 2019.

Before her death, an Executive Magistrate recorded her dying declaration, after obtaining a medical fitness certificate, in which she stated that the appellants assaulted her, poured kerosene oil on her, tied her with a rope, and set her ablaze.

The prosecution relied principally on the dying declaration, the testimony of the Executive Magistrate and doctor, and the FSL report detecting kerosene in the seized articles.

The appellants denied the allegations and relied on defence witnesses, including the deceased’s husband and children, who stated that she had committed suicide while suffering from mental illness.

1. Whether the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate was admissible, voluntary, reliable, and sufficient by itself to sustain the appellants’ conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC.

2. Whether the defence evidence suggesting suicide and the deceased’s alleged mental illness created sufficient doubt regarding the prosecution case.

3. Whether the Trial Court’s conviction and sentence suffered from any legal infirmity or perversity warranting appellate interference.

The Court applied Section 374(2) CrPC, governing appeals against conviction by a Sessions Court, and Sections 302/34 IPC, relating to murder committed with common intention.

Under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a statement made by a deceased person concerning the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death is relevant, even if the maker was not under expectation of death.

Relying on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, the Court reiterated that a dying declaration may relate to homicide or suicide and may be admissible if it concerns the cause of death or circumstances leading to it.

Under Purshottam Chopra v. State (GNCT of Delhi), a dying declaration may form the sole basis of conviction if it is voluntary, coherent, consistent, made in a fit state of mind, and free from tutoring or prompting.

The Court also relied on Irfan @ Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra, which require the prosecution to establish that the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful, credible, and made while the victim was mentally fit; once it inspires confidence, corroboration is not legally necessary.

The Court found that the dying declaration was duly proved by PW-6, the Executive Magistrate, who recorded it pursuant to an official memo and stated that it contained the deceased’s answers to questions put to her.

Its reliability was supported by PW-8, the treating doctor, who certified the deceased’s mental fitness to make the statement.

The declaration specifically identified both appellants, described the assault, pouring of kerosene, tying with a rope, and setting the deceased on fire, and stated that her son subsequently extinguished the flames.

The medical evidence established extensive antemortem burns consistent with the account of having been set ablaze, while the FSL report confirmed the presence of kerosene in the jerrican, matchbox, and burnt clothing.

The Court rejected the defence version of suicide because the defence witnesses were close relatives of both the deceased and the appellants and were treated as interested witnesses; their testimony could not displace the independent and medically supported dying declaration.

The alleged mental illness was also not established as a sufficient reason to disregard the declaration, and the husband’s alleged burn injuries were unsupported by medical documentation.

Accordingly, the Court held that the dying declaration was voluntary, credible, and sufficient to sustain the conviction without further corroboration.

It held that the dying declaration was legally admissible, properly recorded, supported by medical evidence, and sufficiently reliable to constitute the sole basis for conviction.

The appellants, stated to be in custody since 23 October 2019, were directed to undergo the entire sentence awarded by the Trial Court.

The Registry was directed to send the judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail and inform the appellants of their right to approach the Supreme Court with legal-aid assistance.