Common disciplinary proceedings are valid where employees face common allegations or evidence under Rule 18.

The applicants, working as Chargemen Grade-I (Technical) at Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi, were proceeded against under a charge memorandum dated 21 November 2009 for allegedly tampering with and interchanging the identification numbers of radial drilling machines, thereby violating Rule 3(1)(i) and (iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

A common departmental inquiry was conducted, and the Inquiry Officer submitted a report dated 23 November 2011 finding the charges proved.

After considering the applicants’ representations, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of reduction of pay by two stages for one year with cumulative effect by order dated 6 May 2014.

Their appeals dated 7 July 2014 were rejected by the Appellate Authority on 25 September 2017.

Whether the charge memorandum was issued by a competent disciplinary authority, and whether the subsequent correction of the authority’s description invalidated the disciplinary proceedings.

Whether the appointment of the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer was valid in law.

Whether a common departmental inquiry against both applicants was legally permissible under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

Whether the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the penalty order, and the appellate order were vitiated by procedural illegality, violation of natural justice, perversity, or non-application of mind.

The Tribunal applied the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, particularly Rule 18(1) and (2), which permits a common proceeding where two or more Government servants are concerned in the same case or in cases involving common allegations or evidence.

It relied on Balbir Chand v. Food Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 371, which recognised joint disciplinary proceedings as a salutary method to avoid multiplicity of inquiries, duplication of evidence, delay, and conflicting findings where the delinquents are involved in the same transaction.

The Tribunal also applied the principle that an inadvertent typographical error or incorrect description in a charge memorandum does not invalidate the proceeding where the memorandum was issued with the competent authority’s approval, its substance remained unchanged, and no prejudice to the employee’s defence was demonstrated.

The charges themselves were framed under Rule 3(1)(i) and (iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, concerning integrity and conduct unbecoming of a Government servant.

The Tribunal found that the competent Disciplinary Authority had approved issuance of the charge memorandum on 29 September 2009, and that the Senior General Manager merely signed and issued it on behalf of the DGOF/Chairman, OFB.

The later correction replacing the reference to the General Manager with the DGOF, OFB altered only the description of the issuing authority and did not change the charges or prejudice the applicants.

Since the charge memorandum was validly authorised, the challenge to the appointment of the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer also failed.

The common inquiry was held permissible because the allegations arose from substantially the same transaction and involved common evidence; Rule 18 expressly authorised such a proceeding, and the applicants could not establish any prejudice resulting from it.

The Tribunal further accepted that the Inquiry Officer relied on documentary and oral evidence, that the inquiry report was furnished to the applicants, and that the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities independently considered the relevant material and the applicants’ representations.

Accordingly, no jurisdictional defect, denial of reasonable opportunity, perversity, or failure of application of mind was established.

It held that the charge memorandum had been issued with the approval of the competent Disciplinary Authority; the common inquiry and appointments of the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were legally valid; and the typographical correction did not vitiate the proceedings in the absence of prejudice.

The penalty order and the appellate order were upheld, and both Original Applications—OA/310/01445/2018 and OA/310/01446/2018—were dismissed.

There was no order as to costs.