A Will executed after land acquisition and vesting cannot confer any right, title, or interest therein.

The petitioner claimed ownership and possession of Revenue Survey No. 83/2 and sought quashing of the Mamlatdar’s order dated 19 April 2016, which refused to remove Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation’s (“GIDC”) name from the revenue records.

He alleged that although the land had been proposed for acquisition under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it was excluded from the subsequent Section 6 notification and that GIDC’s name was wrongly entered in the revenue record between 1997–98 and 2005–06.

During hearing, he stated that his claim was based on a Will executed by the original owner, though this assertion was not made in the petition.

The State produced material showing that acquisition proceedings had been completed through an award dated 19 January 1975 under Section 11, and that the original owner, Kikabhai Lalabhai Patel, had received compensation.

The petitioner’s later applications for mutation based on a Will, and his application seeking deletion of GIDC’s name, were rejected; subsequent revenue proceedings and mutation applications remained pending.

The Court also noted that the Will relied upon by the petitioner was executed after completion of the acquisition proceedings and vesting of the land.

Whether the petitioner could seek writ relief for deletion of GIDC’s name from the revenue record without establishing a valid right, title, or interest in the acquired land.

Whether the petitioner’s claim based on a subsequently executed Will could prevail against completed land-acquisition proceedings, an award dated 19 January 1975, payment of compensation, and GIDC’s recorded ownership.

Whether the Mamlatdar’s order dated 19 April 2016 refusing to remove GIDC’s name from the revenue record warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court applied the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, particularly Sections 4, 6 and 11, governing notification, declaration and award in acquisition proceedings.

The Court proceeded on the principle that once acquisition proceedings are completed, compensation is paid and the land vests pursuant to the acquisition, the former owner cannot subsequently transfer or bequeath an enforceable interest in the acquired land.

It also applied the settled principle that revenue entries are fiscal records and cannot establish or confer title; a person seeking correction of such entries must first demonstrate a legally sustainable right, title or interest.

Writ jurisdiction cannot be used to adjudicate or protect a bald and unsupported claim of ownership.

The Court found that the petitioner had not disclosed in the petition how he acquired title and had relied only on revenue extracts and an asserted Will.

His claim was further undermined by the fact that GIDC had been recorded in the revenue records from 1997–98, whereas the petitioner claimed through a Will executed much later.

The State’s evidence showed that the acquisition had culminated in an award dated 19 January 1975 and that the original owner had accepted compensation.

Accordingly, the Court held that the petitioner could not derive any enforceable right from a Will executed after acquisition and vesting of the land.

The alleged exclusion of the land from the Section 6 notification was unsupported by the record and was found to be misleading.

In these circumstances, the challenge to the Mamlatdar’s order and the prayer for correction of the revenue record were held to be wholly misconceived.

It held that the petitioner had failed to establish any subsisting right, title or interest in the land and that his claim under the subsequent Will could not displace GIDC’s rights arising from completed acquisition proceedings.

The petition was dismissed as misconceived, with no order as to costs.