A withdrawn writ cause cannot be revived indirectly through intervention in another proceeding.

The applicant sought intervention and impleadment under Chapter VI, Rule 27 of the Orissa High Court Rules in a writ petition challenging the appellate order in OLR Appeal No. 15 of 2024/2025, by which an order of conversion under Section 8-A of the Odisha Land Reforms Act had been set aside.

The applicant alleged that the disputed land was recorded as “Rakhit Khata” with kisam “Jungle” in the 1973 Settlement Record of Rights, whereas the writ petitioner relied on a later Record of Rights describing it as “Stitiban” with kisam “Patita”; the applicant alleged that the latter record was forged or manipulated.

The writ petitioner opposed the application, contending that the applicant had no personal or legal interest, was not a party to the revenue proceedings, and had earlier withdrawn W.P.(C)(PIL) No. 20181 of 2026 concerning substantially the same subject matter without obtaining liberty to initiate fresh proceedings.

The intervention application was filed after the writ petition had been heard and judgment reserved.

Whether the applicant, who claimed no title, possession, leasehold right, or other proprietary interest in the disputed land, was entitled to intervene or be impleaded as a necessary or proper party in the writ petition?

Whether a claim of being a public-spirited person interested in protecting forest land conferred sufficient locus standi to intervene in a private writ proceeding?

Whether the applicant could indirectly revive and agitate substantially the same cause after withdrawing an earlier PIL without liberty to institute fresh proceedings?

Whether the intervention application impermissibly sought to enlarge the scope of the writ petition by introducing disputes concerning the Record of Rights, lease, forest character of the land, and alleged collusion?

Under Chapter VI, Rule 27 of the Orissa High Court Rules, intervention is discretionary and depends on the applicant demonstrating a legally relevant interest in the proceeding. A necessary party is one without whom no effective order can be passed, while a proper party is one whose presence is necessary for complete and effective adjudication.

The rule of locus standi under Article 226 is flexible, and a stranger may, in exceptional cases, invoke writ jurisdiction where he possesses a substantial and genuine interest, as recognized in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 1 SCC 671.

The principle underlying Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC applies to writ proceedings: where a writ petition is withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition, the remedy under Article 226 is deemed abandoned in respect of the same cause of action, as held in Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1987) 1 SCC 5.

The Court also relied on the principles concerning necessary and proper parties in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524; Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417; and Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384.

It further relied on State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das, (2023) 15 SCC 273, concerning the impermissibility of circumventing the consequences of withdrawal by pursuing the same cause through another proceeding.

The Court held that the applicant had no independent legal or proprietary interest in the land and had not participated in either the Tahasildar’s proceedings or the statutory appeal.

The writ petition was confined to the legality of the appellate authority’s order and consequential revenue action, and could be effectively decided on the existing record and pleadings, particularly since the State was already a party and had placed its position before the Court.

Although environmental and forest protection may justify public-interest litigation in an appropriate case, the applicant’s general assertion of public-spiritedness did not make his presence necessary or proper in this proceeding.

The allegations concerning manipulation of the Record of Rights, alteration of the land’s kisam, invalidity of the lease, and collusion were disputed factual matters and were not necessary to resolve the writ petitioner’s challenge to the appellate order.

The State’s own challenge to the conversion order, its successful appeal, and initiation of resumption proceedings prima facie militated against the allegation of collusion.

Further, because the applicant had withdrawn an earlier PIL concerning the same land without liberty to institute fresh proceedings, permitting him to raise substantially identical allegations through intervention would circumvent the principle in Sarguja Transport Service and impermissibly enlarge the scope of the pending writ petition.

The belated filing, after reservation of judgment, provided an additional reason against intervention.

Accordingly, I.A. No. 13540 of 2026 was dismissed, and W.P.(C) No. 33186 of 2025 was directed to be listed on 2 September 2026.