A woman's right to reproductive autonomy includes the sole authority to terminate pregnancy without husband's consent.

The petitioner, a legally wedded wife, sought a writ of mandamus permitting the medical termination of her pregnancy, which was at 13 weeks and 1 day at the time of filing.

The petitioner and her husband (Respondent No. 3) had initially agreed to a compromise and divorce following criminal proceedings; however, the husband subsequently withdrew his willingness to proceed with the divorce.

The petitioner alleged that continuing the pregnancy would cause her severe mental trauma, emotional suffering, and socio-economic instability.

Although the pregnancy was within the statutory 20-week limit where court intervention is generally not mandatory, the petitioner approached the High Court seeking protection against potential legal objections from her husband.

Section 3(2) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act, 1971, which allows termination up to 20 weeks based on the opinion of a registered medical practitioner.

Rule 3B(c) of the MTP Rules, 2003, which recognizes a "change of marital status" during pregnancy as a valid ground for termination.

The constitutional principles of reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity under Article 21 as established in X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department (2023) 9 SCC 433, which held that the woman is the ultimate decision-maker regarding her pregnancy.

Kerala High Court's precedent in X v. Union of India (2022) clarifying that a husband's permission is not required.

The Court observed that the petitioner’s pregnancy (13 weeks) fell squarely within the permissible statutory limit of Section 3(2)(a) of the Act.

Applying the ratio from the Apex Court in X v. Principal Secretary, the Court reasoned that the burden of an unwanted pregnancy falls disproportionately on the woman, affecting her mental and physical health regardless of marital status.

The Court found that the breakdown of the matrimonial relationship and the impending divorce constituted a "change in material circumstances" as contemplated by Rule 3B, rendering the petitioner eligible for termination.

The Court further determined that since the right to reproductive choice is a fundamental facet of personal liberty under Article 21, the husband’s lack of consent or absence in the proceedings was legally insignificant to the petitioner's right to terminate the pregnancy.

It granted the petition and permitted the petitioner to undergo medical termination of her pregnancy.

The Court directed the medical practitioners to follow standard protocols and safety guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and the Apex Court, while noting that since no criminal offence was involved, the preservation of fetal DNA was not required in this specific instance.