A writ court cannot reappreciate departmental evidence where findings rest on some evidence and due process.

The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector of Police posted at Kotwali, Vidisha, investigated Crime No. 458/2016 registered under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(N) of the IPC and Sections 3/4 and 5/6 of the POCSO Act.

A complaint was made alleging that he demanded and accepted ₹6,000 from the complainant’s family and subsequently demanded ₹500 for photocopying documents connected with filing the charge-sheet.

A departmental charge-sheet was issued on 13 January 2019. The petitioner denied the allegations and submitted his reply on 18 February 2019.

The Inquiry Officer submitted a report dated 23 October 2020 finding the charges proved.

The Deputy Inspector General of Police (Rural), Bhopal, thereafter imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement by order dated 4 December 2020. The petitioner’s departmental appeal was dismissed by the Inspector General of Police, Bhopal, on 25 March 2021.

Whether the disciplinary proceedings and the orders imposing compulsory retirement and dismissing the departmental appeal were vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice, statutory procedure or bias.

Whether the Deputy Inspector General of Police was competent under Regulations 214 and 222 of the M.P. Police Regulations to impose the penalty of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner, a Sub-Inspector.

Whether the High Court, exercising judicial review under Article 226, could reappreciate the evidence or interfere with the disciplinary findings and punishment.

Article 226 of the Constitution permits judicial review of the decision-making process in disciplinary proceedings, but the High Court does not act as an appellate authority or reappreciate evidence.

Under State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, interference is justified where the enquiry is conducted by an incompetent authority, violates natural justice or statutory procedure, is based on no evidence, or produces a perverse conclusion.

The same principles were reiterated in State of Karnataka v. N. Gangraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423; High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416; State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584; and Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610.

The Court also applied the principle that departmental proceedings require proof on a preponderance of probabilities rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt, as recognised in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618.

Regulations 214 and 222 of the M.P. Police Regulations were treated as conferring competence upon the DIG to impose compulsory retirement upon a Sub-Inspector, consistent with I.G. Police v. Haribabu Broker, 1980 (2) MPWN 280.

The Court found that the departmental enquiry was conducted after adequate notice and opportunity to defend.

The petitioner participated in the proceedings, examined witnesses and made submissions; the enquiry report was also supplied to him and his representation was considered by the disciplinary authority.

The record contained witness statements and other material supporting the allegation that the petitioner demanded and accepted illegal gratification, including the complainant’s statement and the statements of family members regarding payments of ₹4,000, ₹2,000 and ₹500.

Consequently, the findings were not based on no evidence or on a perverse appreciation of the record.

Applying the limited scope of judicial review, the Court declined to reassess the credibility or adequacy of the evidence.

It further accepted that the DIG was competent to impose the punishment under Regulations 214 and 222.

Since no violation of natural justice, statutory rules, bias, perversity or lack of jurisdiction was established, and the punishment was not shown to be mala fide or shockingly disproportionate, no ground for interference was made out.

The Court further held that it could not reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own view for that of the disciplinary and appellate authorities under Article 226.

The punishment order dated 4 December 2020 and the appellate order dated 25 March 2021 were affirmed, and the writ petition was dismissed.