A writ for salary dues is not maintainable against a non-State company amid pending labour proceedings.

The appellants, who were workmen of respondent No. 1, a public limited company, sought payment of unpaid salaries and other employment-related dues, including gratuity and provident fund benefits, allegedly pending since 1997.

They also sought directions requiring the respondents to comply with labour laws.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that it was not maintainable against the company.

In appeal, it was noted that the appellants had already approached the Labour Court regarding the same dispute and that those proceedings were pending when the writ petition was filed.

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against respondent No. 1, a privately controlled public limited company that is not “State” within the meaning of Article 12.

Whether the appellants could pursue a writ petition seeking substantially the same relief while proceedings concerning the dispute were already pending before the Labour Court.

The Court applied the constitutional distinction between bodies constituting “State” under Article 12 and private entities, holding that a company not under Government control cannot ordinarily be proceeded against through the Court’s writ jurisdiction on the basis of the employment claim asserted in the petition.

The Court further applied the principle against pursuing parallel remedies, particularly where an appropriate statutory forum—in this case, the Labour Court—was already seized of the same or substantially similar dispute.

No specific judicial precedent was relied upon in the judgment; the Court considered the authorities cited by the appellants to be irrelevant.

The appellants’ substantive claim was for recovery of salary and other service-related dues from their employer.

Since respondent No. 1 was a company not controlled by the Government, it was not “State” under Article 12, and the Court upheld the view that the writ petition was not maintainable in the circumstances.

Independently, the appellants’ own pleadings established that they had already initiated proceedings before the Labour Court and that those proceedings remained pending.

The writ petition therefore amounted to pursuing a parallel remedy for substantially the same relief, which the Court held ought not to have been entertained.

The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed, with no further relief granted.