### A Writ Petition Challenging Dispossession Based on Apprehension Without a Concrete Adverse Order Is Premature

The petitioner, a proprietorship concern, was allotted industrial land (parts of Plot Nos. 32 and 45) in Khargone via a registered lease deed dated 09.06.2009, valid until 2039.

An adjoining portion of the same plots was allotted to a separate unit, M/s Ramkrishna Industries.

The respondent authorities initiated lease cancellation proceedings and prepared a possession Panchnama specifically against M/s Ramkrishna Industries on 08.05.2025.

The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226, alleging that under the guise of the proceedings against the third party, the respondents were unlawfully dispossessing the petitioner without independent notice or due process.

The State contended the petition was premature as no action had been initiated against the petitioner's specific lease rights.

1. Whether the writ petition is maintainable at a stage where the petitioner’s grievance is based on an apprehension of dispossession rather than a concrete adverse order.

2. Whether the respondent’s actions against a third party (M/s Ramkrishna Industries) constitute a violation of the petitioner’s rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 300-A of the Constitution.

The Court primarily applied the principle of "cause of action" within the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, establishing that extraordinary jurisdiction cannot be invoked based on mere apprehension.

It further reinforced the Principles of Natural Justice, which require that any adverse action against a leaseholder must be preceded by a show-cause notice and an opportunity for a hearing.

The court also relied on the doctrine of distinct legal entity, noting that proceedings against one unit do not automatically extend to another.

The Court examined the record and found an absence of any show-cause notice or independent lease cancellation order directed at the petitioner.

It reasoned that while the petitioner feared dispossession due to the Panchnama prepared against M/s Ramkrishna Industries, such a fear does not constitute a "sufficient cause of action" for judicial intervention at this juncture.

The Court determined that the petition was fundamentally "premature" because the respondents' legal actions were strictly confined to a separate legal entity.

However, the Court balanced this by observing that should the Department of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) decide to take any future action against the petitioner, it is legally bound to act strictly in accordance with the law and the principles of natural justice.

The Court concluded that an apprehension of dispossession, without a specific adverse order, does not justify the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Writ Petition was dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.