Absence from duty due to documented illness cannot be deemed willful misconduct or ground for suspension.

The petitioner, a member of the Bihar Administrative Service since 1996, was transferred to Katihar in 2021.

He suffers from a chronic psychosomatic disorder, a condition previously recognized by the State when it regularized a prior four-year medical leave.

In April 2023, after exhausting four days of sanctioned casual leave, his health deteriorated; he submitted medical records from AIIMS and Medanta Hospital advising bed rest, yet he was served with show-cause notices for unauthorized absence.

Despite his detailed responses, the State placed him under suspension on January 23, 2025, under Rule 9(1)(a) of the Bihar CCA Rules, and subsequently initiated formal departmental proceedings under Rule 17 on August 19, 2025.

The petitioner challenged the suspension, the charge memo, and the initiation of proceedings via this writ petition and four interlocutory applications.

Rule 3 of the Bihar Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1976, regarding devotion to duty.

Rule 9(1)(a) of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, regarding suspension.

Supreme Court precedent in Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, which held that unauthorized absence is not misconduct unless it is proved to be "willful".

Chhel Singh v. M.G.B. Gramin Bank, stating that unimpeachable medical certificates cannot be ignored without valid reasons.

Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, which mandates that suspension should not extend indefinitely without a reasoned extension.

The Court observed that the petitioner’s medical records from AIIMS were of "unimpeachable character" and were not contested by the State; in fact, the State admitted in its counter-affidavit that the illness was not a pretense.

Applying Krushnakant B. Parmar, the Court reasoned that the burden lay on the Disciplinary Authority to prove the absence was "willful," which they failed to do, as the absence was clearly due to "compelling circumstances" of illness.

The Court dismissed the State's argument regarding the lack of "prescribed format" for leave applications, holding that procedural defects are curable and cannot override substantive justice when a genuine illness exists.

The Court found the suspension, which exceeded fifteen months, to be "indefinite and unending," violating the timelines established in Ajay Kumar Choudhary and the State's own circulars.

The Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the suspension order (Memo 1396), the charge memo, and the resolution initiating departmental proceedings (Memo 15354).

The respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits.

The Court ordered a fresh consideration of the petitioner’s induction into the I.A.S. cadre, uninfluenced by the quashed penalties, in accordance with the 1955 Regulations.