Absence of Direct Nexus Between Accused and Death Precludes Criminal Liability Under Section 106(1) BNS

On November 5, 2025, a worker (M. Bhaskar Rao) died after falling from the ceiling of an Ice Plant during electrical re-wiring work.

The petitioner, Pankaj Kumar Dhingra, held a Power of Attorney (PoA) for his mother, the owner of the sub-contracting firm "M/s Navjeevan Enterprise".

The police filed Charge Sheet No. 92/2025 under Section 106(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, alleging the petitioner was negligent for not being present at the site, for failing to ensure supervision, and for failing to provide safety equipment.

The petitioner moved the High Court to quash the proceedings, arguing that he was geographically distant, the PoA only authorized administrative work, and Departmental Engineers—not the sub-contractor—were responsible for site supervision.

1. Whether the allegations in the Charge Sheet disclose a prima facie case of "causing death" by a "rash or negligent act" under Section 106(1) of the BNS

2. Whether a contractual obligation to indemnify for accidents creates a criminal liability under BNS

Section 106(1) of the BNS (corresponding to Section 304A of the IPC), which requires that the accused's act be the direct or proximate cause of death (causa causans).

I. B. Bhalla v. State (1989) to establish that a mere breach of regulations does not suffice unless the act is the direct cause of death.

Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra (2025) to conclude that accidental falls from heights where equipment like ladders were provided do not constitute criminal negligence.

The court found no direct nexus between the petitioner’s actions and the victim’s death; the Charge Sheet admitted that an aluminum ladder was provided, and the victim fell while using unauthorized wooden planks; thus, no "rash act" by the petitioner was established.

The "proximate cause" requirement was missing because the petitioner was not present at the site and was not legally bound to be there. Document evidence showed the APWD Departmental Engineer was responsible for on-site monitoring, not the petitioner.

The PoA limited the petitioner's role to administrative and "official works," excluding technical supervision.

Clause 32 of the contract, which held the contractor responsible for mishaps, created only civil liabilities for compensation and could not be the trigger for a criminal prosecution.

The court allowed the petition, setting aside and quashing FIR No. 73/25, Charge Sheet No. 92/2025, and the consequential proceedings in G.R. Case No. 631 of 2025, as continuing the proceedings would constitute a gross abuse of the process of law.