### Absence of direct participation in triggering offense does not exempt syndicate members managing organizational affairs from prosecution under GUJCTOC Act.

The applicant sought to quash FIR No. 11208055250432 of 2025 registered at DCB Police Station, Rajkot, for offences under Sections 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii), 3(2), and 3(4) of the Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organized Crime Act, 2015 (GUJCTOC Act).

The FIR followed a "triggering incident" on 29.10.2025 involving a public shootout between rival gangs led by Samir @ Murgho Pathan and Rajpalsinh Jadeja.

Although the applicant was not named in the initial FIR for the shootout, subsequent investigation identified him as an active member of Samir’s syndicate.

The prosecution alleged that the applicant managed the syndicate’s finances, provided legal assistance (advocates), and sheltered absconding members while the kingpin was in custody.

The applicant contended he was not present at the shootout and that his implicate was based solely on past cases (two acquittals, one pending) in which he cannot be tried twice.

1. Whether the lack of the applicant’s direct participation in the "triggering" incident or the absence of recent charge-sheets against him individually precludes the invocation of the GUJCTOC Act.

2. Whether prosecuting the applicant under the GUJCTOC Act for conduct involving past offences constitutes double jeopardy.

The Court primarily applied the definitions of "continuing unlawful activity" and "organized crime syndicate" under Sections 2(c) and 2(e) of the GUJCTOC Act.

The Court relied on the precedent Zakir Abdul Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, establishing that the requirement of multiple charge-sheets within ten years applies to the syndicate as a whole, not necessarily to each individual member in isolation.

Section 7 of the GUJCTOC Act empowers the Special Court to try connected offences in the same trial.

The principle of "Double Jeopardy" from T.P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala was considered but distinguished.

The Court reasoned that GUJCTOC is a special statute intended to curb organized crime, and its provisions must be read holistically rather than in isolation.

It held that the "modus operandi" of modern syndicates often involves using individuals without recent criminal records or direct involvement in violent acts to manage logistics and finances; thus, shielding such members would defeat the Act's purpose.

The court noted that while the applicant had few individual charge-sheets, the syndicate he was associated with had over 37 registered offences.

Evidence from secret witness statements and the kingpin’s interrogation prima facie established the applicant as a "manager" who provided sim-cards, weapons, and financial support to the gang.

Regarding double jeopardy, the court clarified that the GUJCTOC proceeding is distinct from the individual triggering offence, and Section 7 allows for joint trials, making the plea of being punished twice for the same act premature and inapplicable at the quashing stage.

The Court dismissed the application in limine, refusing to quash the FIR, and ordered that the prosecution must be afforded the opportunity to prove the nexus and involvement through evidence at trial.