Absence of evidence regarding cleanliness of intermediary sampling vessels vitiates conviction under Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules.

On March 4, 2002, a Food Inspector (PW2) inspected M/s Usha Trading Company and sampled 375 ml of "Ricela" refined rice bran oil

The oil was poured into a jug and then divided into three bottles for analysis

The Public Analyst found the acid value to be 0.66, exceeding the maximum prescribed limit of 0.5, and declared the sample adulterated

The Trial Court convicted the manufacturer, D.K. Kaushal, under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (PFA) Act

However, the Appellate Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent, citing a lack of evidence regarding the cleanliness of the sampling containers, failure to make the oil homogeneous, delay in analysis, and failure to conduct a de novo trial after the Magistrate’s transfer

The State appealed this acquittal

1. Whether the failure to lead specific evidence that the intermediary sampling vessel (jug) was clean and dry violates the mandatory provisions of Rule 14 of the PFA Rules

2. Whether a delay in analyzing oil samples permits an inference that the acid value increased due to oxidation/natural causes

3. Whether a de novo trial is mandatory under Section 326(3) of the CrPC when a case is tried as a summons case rather than in a summary manner

4. What is the scope of interference by an appellate court in a judgment of acquittal

The court applied Section 16(1)(a)(i) and Section 7 of the PFA Act regarding the sale of adulterated food

It relied on Rule 14 of the PFA Rules, which mandatorily requires samples to be taken in "clean dry bottles or jars"

Regarding the delay in analysis, it applied the principle from Nebh Raj v. State (Delhi Admn.), noting that exposure to air and moisture increases free fatty acid content in oils

On the issue of de novo trials, it interpreted Section 326(3) of the CrPC, holding it inapplicable where the full record of evidence is maintained in a summons trial

Finally, it followed Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, establishing that an acquittal should only be disturbed if it is "patently perverse" or based on a misreading of evidence

The High Court observed that while the Food Inspector claimed the bottles were clean, the intermediary jug used to collect the oil belonged to the accused and there was no evidence it was cleaned or dried on the spot

Citing Koyakutty v. Food Inspector, the court held that Rule 14 is mandatory, and failure to prove the cleanliness of the intermediary vessel creates reasonable doubt

Regarding the analysis delay (from March 4 to April 11), the court noted that scientific treatises and precedents confirm that acid values in oil can increase over time due to rancidity/oxidation, thus the sample's integrity was compromised

Although the court corrected the Appellate Court’s finding on the de novo trial—clarifying that since this was a summons case with full depositions, Section 326(3) CrPC did not necessitate a fresh trial—it ultimately found the acquittal justified on other grounds

The court concluded that the Appellate Court had taken a "reasonable view" based on the evidence

It held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the sampling procedure complied with mandatory hygiene rules and that the delay in analysis ruled out the possibility of natural chemical changes in the oil

The respondent was directed to furnish bail bonds under Section 437-A of the CrPC