Absence of express consent in co-existence agreements precludes permissive use of deceptively similar standalone device marks.

Lacoste (Plaintiff), a French company, holds Indian trademark registrations from 1983 for its crocodile device.

Crocodile International (Defendant), a Singaporean company, registered a composite "Crocodile" mark in India in 1952.

The dispute arose in 1998 when the Defendant began using a standalone, unregistered saurian device.

The Defendant claimed entitlement to use this mark in India based on a 1983 Co-existence Agreement (covering five Asian territories) and a 1985 letter.

The Single Judge initially found trademark infringement but rejected Lacoste’s claims of copyright infringement and passing off.

Both parties filed cross-appeals.

Whether the use of the impugned mark by Crocodile International amounts to infringement of Lacoste's copyright?

Whether the 1983 and 1985 Agreements extend to India and entitle the Defendant to use the impugned mark?

Whether the use of the impugned mark in India amounts to trademark infringement?

Whether the use of the impugned mark amounts to passing off?

Whether the suit is barred by acquiescence, and whether the award of costs was justified?

The Court applied Section 13 and 14(c) of the Copyright Act, 1957, regarding the protection of original artistic works and the ‘expression vs. idea’ dichotomy.

It utilized the ‘merger doctrine,’ which denies copyright if an idea can only be expressed in limited ways.

It utilized the ‘substantial similarity’ test from *R.G. Anand v. Delux Films*.

Regarding contracts, it applied Sections 4, 7, and 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, requiring absolute and unqualified acceptance.

For trademarks, it applied the ‘overall similarity’ and ‘initial interest confusion’ tests under Sections 2(h) and 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

It applied the ‘Classic Trinity’ test (goodwill, misrepresentation, damage) for passing off from *Reckitt & Colman v. Borden*.

The Court reversed the Single Judge on copyright, holding that the "merger doctrine" did not apply because a crocodile can be depicted in numerous ways; the Defendant's choice to mirror Lacoste’s specific posture constituted infringement.

Regarding the agreements, the Court found the 1983 Agreement was geographically limited to five specific countries excluding India.

The 1985 letter was a unilateral communication lacking Lacoste’s signature or unqualified acceptance.

On trademark infringement, the Court found the marks visually and conceptually identical, likely to cause "initial interest confusion" among average consumers with imperfect recollection.

The passing off claim failed because Lacoste’s evidence of goodwill in India as of 1998 (CA certificates and news clips) was inadmissible for lacking Section 65B IEA certification and supporting primary documents.

Crocodile International infringed Lacoste’s copyright, and a permanent injunction is granted.

Crocodile International infringed Lacoste’s trademark.

The 1983/1985 agreements do not extend to India.

Passing off was not established due to lack of admissible evidence of prior reputation.

The order of costs against the Defendant was set aside due to Lacoste's procedural delays.

The decree for permanent injunction and rendition of accounts regarding trademark infringement was upheld.