Absence of Hymenal Rupture Does Not Negate Penetrative Sexual Assault if Victim’s Testimony is Reliable

The appellant was convicted by the Special Judge (POCSO), Barpeta, for aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376(AB) of the IPC involving a 9-year-old victim

The victim alleged that the appellant pulled her into a tent, tied her hands, removed her clothes, and committed a "bad act," during which she lost consciousness

The appellant challenged the conviction on two primary grounds: first, that the victim's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. used the term "bad act" rather than specifying sexual intercourse; and second, that medical evidence (PW-6) showed an intact hymen and no evidence of sexual intercourse, despite noted redness and tenderness

1. Whether the use of the term "bad act" in a Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement satisfies the requirement for corroboration of a victim’s testimony regarding penetrative sexual assault in the Trial Court

2. Whether the absence of a ruptured hymen or external injuries in the medical report precludes a conviction for penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act

The court applied Section 3 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act along with Section 376(AB) of the IPC regarding penetrative sexual assault

It relied on several Supreme Court precedents establishing that an intact hymen does not disprove rape, including State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh, State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, and Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh

The court further emphasized the principle from Latesh @ Dadu Baburao Karlekar v. State of Maharashtra that oral testimony of a trustworthy witness takes precedence over medical evidence unless the latter completely refutes the possibility of the occurrence

The court reasoned that while the term "bad act" is broad, its meaning must be derived from the surrounding facts and circumstances. In this case, the victim's statement that the appellant removed her clothes and panties before the "bad act" sufficiently corroborated her trial testimony where she explicitly detailed the penetration

Regarding the medical evidence, the court held that under Section 3 of the POCSO Act, even the "slightest degree of penetration" of the vulva or labia majora constitutes penetrative sexual assault.

The court noted that the redness and tenderness observed by the doctor were consistent with slight penetration, and an intact hymen is not a medical or legal bar to a conviction for rape

The court distinguished this case from Shah Alam (MD) v. State of Assam, where the victim had remained silent when asked to define "bad act"; here, the victim provided a clear and consistent narrative of the assault

The Court upheld the conviction and the sentence of 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, dismissing the appeal

The holding affirms that penetrative sexual assault is a legal conclusion, not a purely medical diagnosis, and does not require complete penetration or injury to the genitals