Absence of limitation for impleadment under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC allows devolution of interest despite delay.

The original plaintiffs (Respondents 1-11) filed a suit for possession in 1974, which was decreed in their favor on September 7, 2011.

During the pendency of the suit and the subsequent appeal filed by the defendants (Appellants), various rights in the suit property were transferred via registered deeds and release deeds among the plaintiffs.

In 2012, approximately one year after the decree, the suit property was conveyed to the Applicant, M/s. Yash Shree Realtors (YSR), a partnership firm comprising several original plaintiffs.

The Applicant sought impleadment under Order XXII Rule 10 and Order I Rule 10 of the CPC in 2025, after a delay of nearly 14 years from the date of the decree.

The Appellants opposed the application, alleging gross delay, fraud, and abatement.

Whether the applicant (successor-in-interest) should be permitted to be added as a respondent under Order XXII Rule 10 read with Order I Rule 10 of the CPC after a delay of 14 years.

Whether the non-impleadment of the transferee pendente lite leads to the abatement of the legal proceedings.

The court applied Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC, which governs the procedure for devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit, noting that unlike Rules 3 and 4, Rule 10 does not prescribe a limitation period or entail automatic abatement.

It relied on Section 146 of the CPC, which allows proceedings to be taken by or against persons claiming under a party.

Precedential support was drawn from *Saila Bala Dassi v. Nirmala Sundari Dassi* [AIR 1958 SC 394], *Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal* [(2004) 2 SCC 601], and *Chandra Bai v. Khandalwal Vipra Vidyalaya Samiti* [(2016) 12 SCC 534], establishing that a transferee pendente lite is a representative-in-interest and that the right to apply under Rule 10 is a continuous right.

The court also invoked its inherent powers under Section 151 and Section 148 of the CPC regarding the condonation of delay.

The court reasoned that since this was a case of devolution of interest (assignment) rather than death, the strict abatement rules of Order XXII Rules 3 and 4 did not apply.

It found the Applicant’s 14-year delay was not mala fide, as the partnership firm consisted of original plaintiffs who were under a bona fide belief that the firm was their "alter ego" and already effectively represented.

The court held that no prejudice would be caused to the Appellants by the impleadment, as the original plaintiffs would remain on record to address any disputes regarding the firm’s existence.

It dismissed the allegations of fraud, noting that the devolution occurred after the trial court's decree, meaning there was no concealment from the trial court.

The court emphasized that a transferee takes the property with all its pros and cons and must be allowed to defend the decree to prevent it from being put at naught.

It held that there is no statutory time limit for an application under Order XXII Rule 10 and that such applications should be construed liberally to advance justice.

To mitigate the delay, the court imposed a cost of ₹50,000 payable to the Appellants and noted the Applicant’s voluntary donation of ₹1.5 lakh to a trust.

The original Respondents 1 to 11 were retained on record to prevent multiplicity of proceedings.