Absence of registered FIR or corroborative evidence of witness threatening precludes cancellation of bail.

The applicant company filed an application under Section 439(2) and 437(5) of the Cr.P.C. (Section 483(3) of the BNSS, 2023) seeking the cancellation of a bail order dated 25.11.2024 granted to Respondent No. 2, Mayank Londe.

The applicant alleged that the respondent misused his liberty by issuing threats to the complainant.

The respondent countered that he was never an employee of the applicant, that the applicant engaged in illegal fund diversion, and that the main accused in the related fraud (Deepanshu Londe) had already been granted bail by the Supreme Court.

The State noted that while a communication regarding threats was received, no F.I.R. had been lodged.

1. Whether the respondent misused the liberty of bail by allegedly threatening the applicant, warranting cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. / Section 483(3) BNSS.

2. Whether there exists sufficient "believable material" or supervening circumstances to justify the interference with the trial court's discretionary order of bail.

The court relied on the established criteria for cancellation of bail as articulated in Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) and reaffirmed in Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022), which include interference with administration of justice, abuse of liberty, or witness tempering.

It further applied the distinction between setting aside an "illegal/perverse" order and "cancelling" bail due to misconduct, as settled in Puran v. Rambilas (2001) and Abdul Basit @ Raju v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary (2014).

The court also noted the bar under Section 362 Cr.P.C. against a court reviewing its own disposal except for clerical errors, unless new circumstances arise.

The Court observed that the considerations for granting bail and cancelling it are fundamentally different; cancellation requires a high threshold of proof regarding the misuse of liberty.

In the present case, the Court found no direct connection between Respondent No. 2 and the applicant company, noting that the primary accused (Deepanshu Londe) had already secured bail from the Apex Court.

Crucially, the Court highlighted the absence of any F.I.R. or "believable material" to substantiate the allegations of threats, concluding that mere communications to police authorities without corroborative legal action do not suffice to prove the misuse of liberty.

The Court determined that the trial court’s original discretion was not perverse and no new supervening facts were proven to warrant the extreme step of cancellation.

Consequently, the High Court found no merit in the application and dismissed it, maintaining that the veracity of threat allegations should be examined by appropriate authorities at the appropriate stage rather than in a summary bail cancellation proceeding.