Absence of Specific Pleadings Demonstrating Material Effect on Election Results Mandates Rejection of Election Petition

The Petitioner, Md. Arif Lalan Khan, challenged the election of Respondent No. 1, Dilip Bhausaheb Lande, from the Chandivali Assembly Constituency in the 2024 Maharashtra State Legislative Assembly elections.

The Petitioner alleged: (A) a violation of Section 126 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 ("the Act") due to a roadshow conducted by star campaigner Eknath Shinde during the 48-hour "silent period".

(B) misleading disclosures in the Form 26 Affidavit regarding civil vs. criminal cases and suppression of residential asset details.

And (C) apprehension of EVM tampering.

Respondent No. 1 filed a "Rejection Application" under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC, contending the petition lacked material facts and failed to disclose a cause of action.

Whether the Election Petition is liable for rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for failure to plead "material facts" as required by Section 83 of the Act.

Whether the alleged prohibited campaign by a star campaigner constitutes "undue influence" under Section 123(2) or a ground for voiding the election under Section 100(1)(b) or 100(1)(d)(iv).

Whether the inclusion of excessive information (civil cases) or minor omissions in the Form 26 Affidavit constitutes a corrupt practice or materially affected the election result.

The Court applied Section 83(1)(a) of the Act, which mandates a concise statement of "material facts," and Section 83(1)(b) requiring "full particulars" of any corrupt practice.

It relied on Section 123(2) defining "undue influence" as direct/indirect interference with the free exercise of electoral rights.

The Court followed the standard in *Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. A. Santhana Kumar*, holding that omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action.

It further cited *Mangani Lal Mandal v. Bishnu Deo Bhandari*, establishing that for Section 100(1)(d)(iv), a petitioner must specifically plead _how_ the alleged non-compliance "materially affected" the election result.

The Court found that while the Petitioner pleaded the _occurrence_ of a roadshow during prohibited hours, he failed to plead how this constituted "undue influence" beyond mere "influence".

Under Section 100(1)(d)(iv), the Petitioner made only a "bald and vague" assertion that the violation materially affected the result without providing a rational basis or factual link to the 20,625-vote margin.

Regarding the Form 26 Affidavit, the Court reasoned that volunteering more information than the statutory minimum (civil cases) is not prohibited and does not constitute a corrupt practice without pleadings showing a subversion of electoral will.

The plea regarding EVM tampering was deemed a mere "apprehension" lacking material particulars to sustain a challenge under Section 100.

The Court held that a violation of Section 126 (prohibited campaign) does not automatically void an election under Section 100 unless the "material effect" on the result is specifically pleaded and proven.

The Election Petition was dismissed; however, the Court clarified that this judgment does not impede separate criminal proceedings under Section 126 or the Petitioner's right to an EVM audit check as per Supreme Court guidelines.